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Security Council

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S/1997/297
10 April 1997

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NOTE BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the members of the Security Council the attached letter dated 8 April 1997, which he has received from the Acting Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

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Annex

Letter dated 8 April 1997 from the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency to the Secretary-General

In paragraph 16 of its resolution 1051 (1996) of 27 March 1996, the Security Council called for the consolidation of the periodic requirements for progress reports under resolutions 699 (1991), 715 (1991) and 1051 (1996), and requested the Director General to submit such consolidated reports every six months to the Council, commencing on 11 April 1996.

Accordingly, I am requesting you kindly to transmit to the President of the Security Council the enclosed third such consolidated semi-annual report under paragraph 16 of resolution 1051 (1996). I remain available for any consultations you or the Council may wish to have.

(Signed) Hans BLIX
Director General

Appendix

Third consolidated report of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency under paragraph 16 of UNSC resolution 1051 (1996)

I. INTRODUCTION

1. In paragraph 16 of resolution 1051, adopted on 27 March 1996, the Security Council called for the consolidation of the periodic progress reports required under resolutions 699 (1991), 715 (1991) and 1051 (1996), and requested the Director General of the IAEA to submit such a consolidated report every six months to the Council, commencing on 11 April 1996.

2. The Director General submits herewith the third[1] such consolidated report under paragraph 16 of resolution 1051 (1996).

3. The report records, inter alia, the IAEA's implementation of its ongoing monitoring and verification (OMV) Plan; indicates the need to revise certain parts of Annex 3 to the Plan; provides examples of Iraq's continuing ability to import technological equipment; records the need for Iraq to improve the quality of its biannual declarations under the OMV Plan; outlines discussions and verification activities related to Iraq's "full, final and complete declaration" (FFCD) of its former nuclear weapons programme; and draws attention to grave concerns about Iraq's obstruction of the unrestricted right of the IAEA and the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) to use rotary and fixed wing aircraft in Iraq and the impact of this obstruction on the IAEA's ability to fully implement its OMV Plan.

II. INSPECTION RELATED ACTIVITIES

A. ONGOING MONITORING AND VERIFICATION

4. In the period under review (2 October 1996 - 31 March 1997), the Baghdad-based IAEA Nuclear Monitoring Group (NMG) conducted more than 200 monitoring inspections at some 91 sites, 28 of which were carried out at sites which had not been previously inspected. This brings the total number of OMV inspections, since the establishment of the NMG in August 1994, to over 850. The majority of these inspections were carried out with

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no prior announcement and a number of them were conducted in co-operation with UNSCOM monitoring groups. No indication of prohibited equipment, materials or activities was detected during these inspections.

5. Nonetheless, Iraq is still able to import technological equipment, recent examples of which include a plasma spray machine, a general purpose CNC milling machine and personal computer components having 1996-generation microprocessors. These items were imported through trans-shipment, via neighbouring countries, thus avoiding the identification of Iraq as the end-user. There is no indication of attempts on the part of Iraq to disguise these imports and the plasma spray machine, which unambiguously conforms to the specification in Annex 3 to the OMV Plan and was imported prior to the 27 May 1996 entry into force of the import/export mechanism, was correctly included in Iraq's biannual declaration for the receiving facility.

6. Experience gained in the practical implementation of the OMV Plan has shown the need for a number of revisions to the specifications of certain dual-use equipment and materials detailed in Annex 3. For example, the specification of electronic digital computers should be revised to take account of the escalation, in recent years, in theoretical operational capabilities of what have become commonplace microprocessors and the need to cover computer sub-assemblies. There is also a need to examine the possible introduction of a limit to the total quantity of tritium that may be accumulated in the form of luminescent devices.

7. The NMG has continued its ongoing programme of interviews of key personnel of the former Iraqi nuclear weapons programme. These interviews permit the IAEA to clarify points regarding the former programme and, in particular, to verify the current assignments of such personnel.

8. The eighth periodic radiometric survey of Iraq's main water bodies was conducted from 15 to 23 October 1996. Samples of water, sediments and biota were collected at 16 sites selected at random from the more than 50 locations for which baseline data had been established in the original survey completed in November 1992. Samples were also taken from two locations at a water treatment plant south-east of Baghdad.

9. The results of previous surveys have shown no indication of Iraq having carried out any proscribed nuclear activities but have confirmed the

sensitivity of the technology by its ability to detect clear indications of Iraq's legitimate use of radioisotopes in medical applications.

10. With the assistance of Member States the IAEA continues to improve the capabilities of its OMV activities by the introduction of improved technology. Equipping of the NMG environmental sample screening laboratory, located in the Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre, will commence in April 1997. Other efforts are currently focused on the introduction of improved equipment for aerosol sampling and fixed-point and land-vehicle-based radiometric surveys. With the support of the Governments of France, Chile and Germany, work is in progress to reconfigure the gamma-spectrometric equipment package to suit the Chilean UH-1H helicopter to facilitate the reintroduction of aerial radiometric surveys.

11. The IAEA and UNSCOM have continued their implementation of a joint programme of inspection of Iraqi sites which, in the judgement of IAEA/UNSCOM, are deemed to have capabilities suitable for conducting work on some aspect of weapons of mass destruction, notwithstanding the lack of evidence or indication of such work. The carrying out of joint IAEA/UNSCOM multi-disciplinary inspections at "capable" sites on a regular basis continues to contribute to the effectiveness of the OMV Plans to detect any attempt by Iraq to conduct activities proscribed by Security Council resolutions. In the period under review, 20 inspections at "capable" sites - co-ordinated by the IAEA - were conducted by joint IAEA/UNSCOM teams. No indication of prohibited equipment, materials or activities was detected.

B. IRAQ'S "FULL, FINAL AND COMPLETE DECLARATION"

12. As previously reported, resulting from the revelations following the departure from Iraq, in August 1995, of Lt. General Hussein Kamel, the IAEA required Iraq to provide a revised and self-contained, "full, final and complete declaration" (FFCD) of its past nuclear programme. Detailed discussions between the IAEA and Iraq on two successive draft versions of this declaration resulted in Iraq's production of a third version which was received at the IAEA's Vienna headquarters on 17 September 1996. This version was again subjected to detailed technical examination by the IAEA, aided by experts from Member States and a series of meetings were held in February 1997 to discuss, with the Iraqi counterpart, the matters arising

from the examination. Iraq provided a written response to the matters discussed and this response is currently under evaluation, again with the assistance of Member State experts, in order to determine whether the incorporation of the information, provided in Iraq's response, into the current (third) draft of the FFCD will provide an acceptably comprehensive declaration of Iraq's former nuclear weapons programme.

13. In parallel with this evaluation the IAEA has made further progress in its endeavours to verify the statements made in the FFCD regarding the burial of materials and equipment which had been destroyed, either as a direct result of the Gulf War, or through Iraq's unilateral post-war action. Three principal burial sites to the south of Lake Tharthar have been thoroughly searched using sub-surface sensing technologies and all metallic items, so detected, have been excavated. The material and equipment recovered originate from Iraq's past gaseous diffusion and gas centrifuge uranium enrichment programmes and initial assessment indicates that the number and nature of items found are not inconsistent with the statements made in the FFCD, although further evaluation is required. The bulk of the recovered equipment had, consistent with Iraq's declaration, been destroyed; however, there was also a large number of specialised corrosion resistant valves, with an estimated value of hundreds of thousands of dollars, which were in "as-new" condition. The Iraqi counterpart has been asked to explain the origin and intended purpose of these valves. Similar excavation and recovery work is currently underway at the Tuwaitha site and is expected to be completed within a few weeks.

14. Despite these practical measures, the level of confidence in the verification of the FFCD would be enhanced by the provision, by Iraq, of additional documentation, relating, in particular, to centrifuge enrichment and weaponisation.

C. IRAQI DOCUMENTATION

15. In earlier discussions with the Iraqi counterpart, the IAEA had asserted that Iraq's stated abandonment of its former nuclear weapons programme and the reassignment of the related industrial and research assets, must have been recorded in official documentation. As a result the IAEA was provided, in February, with copies of official documentation recording the dissolution of project "Petrochemical 3", the cover name

given to Iraq's nuclear weapons programme and the redefinition of the missions of several establishments formerly associated with that programme. These documents have been translated and are currently being reviewed. Access to authentic documentation of such nature is an essential component of the IAEA's verification of the status of Iraq's former nuclear weapons programme. Additional documentation will be requested as necessary.

D. INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

16. The databases of the Action Team's computerised information system have been updated to include information obtained from inspection activities and the more detailed information declared by Iraq with respect to materials and equipment used in its past nuclear weapons programme. These updates include the previous and current locations of these materials and items of equipment, their operational status, detailed specifications, purposes of use, projects and procurement history. The optical image databases are being expanded to include information on site plans, buildings, and equipment for sites which are routinely monitored. Progress has been made in the design and development of the prototype of a computerised export/import information system to be used by the Action Team in the context of UNSC resolution 1051 (1996). Databases have been created containing the text of Iraq's FFCD and its annexes of related equipment and materials, to facilitate the analysis of its completeness.

E. PROVISION OF INFORMATION BY IRAQ UNDER THE OMV PLAN

17. Under paragraph 22 and Annex 2 of the OMV Plan (document S/22872 Rev.1 and Corr. 1 (1991)), Iraq provides biannual declarations - in January and July - on the current use of facilities, installations and sites, including those formerly involved in its covert nuclear programme and on changes during the previous six months regarding the inventory and location of materials, equipment and radioisotopes identified in Annexes 3 and 4 of the Plan.

18. In November 1996, the Iraqi National Monitoring Directorate (NMD) was asked to include supplementary information in the declarations of the current activities at certain sites involved in the production of materials, equipment and components, as well as sites involved in design and in research and development work. The supplementary information, which

includes detailed descriptions of the current usage of the declared equipment and materials, is intended to improve the efficiency of IAEA monitoring and verification activities in Iraq. The Action Team's review of the January 1997 declaration showed that only part of the required supplementary information had been included and Iraq, through the NMD, has requested clarifications of some of the required information elements. It is expected that this matter will be resolved in the near future. Although tangible progress has been made, there remains the need to improve the quality and completeness of the information declared by Iraq. Increased priority is being given to this matter.

F. RELEASE, RELOCATION AND CHANGE OF USE OF EQUIPMENT, MATERIAL AND FACILITIES

19. In the period under review, the NMD has submitted 14 requests to the IAEA concerning the release/relocation of equipment and materials or change of use of monitored buildings. Such requests are processed in consultation with the Special Commission and 8 have been approved. Items for which release, relocation or change of use is approved remain subject to ongoing monitoring and verification at a frequency commensurate with their significance.

III. HIGH-LEVEL TECHNICAL TALKS

20. On 7 March 1997, Iraq's Foreign Minister, Mohammed Said Al Sahaf, met with the Director General at the IAEA headquarters in Vienna to discuss current issues which were of concern to the Iraqi government. Foreign Minister Al Sahaf's principal objective was to determine specifically which matters remained to be cleared before the IAEA would be in a position to report to the Security Council on the status of IAEA activities with respect to Iraq's fulfilment of its obligations under resolution 687 (1991). In response the Director General expressed his appreciation of Iraq's concern but considered that it was inappropriate, at this stage, to specify in detail the outstanding matters. Foreign Minister Al Sahaf nonetheless emphasised Iraq's commitment to provide full co-operation to the IAEA in order that all matters might be resolved as soon as possible.

21. The Director General took the opportunity to discuss with Foreign Minister Al Sahaf, Iraq's commitments, under Security Council resolutions

687 (1991) and 707 (1991), to reaffirm unconditionally its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to comply fully with its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA. The Director General also referred to the goal of establishing in the Middle East a zone free from weapons of mass destruction, as discussed in paragraph 14 of resolution 687(1991) and brought to the attention of Foreign Minister Al Sahaf the Safeguards technical workshop - for experts from the Middle East and other states - which is to be held at the IAEA headquarters from 12 to 15 May 1997.

22. The Director General expressed his grave concern about Iraq's obstruction of the right of the IAEA and UNSCOM to operate fixed-wing aircraft in Iraq and encouraged Foreign Minister Al Sahaf to bring his influence to bear to resolve this issue without delay[2].

23. The Director General also made it clear that the IAEA's focus on the implementation of the OMV did not foreclose the right of the IAEA to further investigate, at any time, any aspects of Iraq's former nuclear weapons programme on the basis of information deriving from Iraq's declarations, from the IAEA's inspection activities or from other sources, where, in the opinion of the IAEA, such further investigation was warranted. In response, Foreign Minister Al Sahaf pledged Iraq's commitment to co-operate with the IAEA in the resolution of any such matters, at any time.

IV. SUMMARY

24. The IAEA continues with the rigorous implementation of its Plan for the monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with Security Council resolutions through the resident inspectors of the Nuclear Monitoring Group with the assistance of, and in full co-ordination with, the Special Commission. As underlined in previous reports to the Council, the implementation of the OMV Plan does not foreclose the exercise by the IAEA

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[2] In February last, Iraq refused to provide facilities at the former Basrah International airport to facilitate UNSCOM's use of the L-100 fixed wing transport aircraft to provide logistical support for OMV inspections in southern Iraq. Additionally, there have recently been many attempts by Iraq to restrict the flight path of Chilean UH-1H helicopters, flown on behalf of UNSCOM and IAEA, citing the risks of traversing "free-fire zones" as justification. Neither UNSCOM nor IAEA have any knowledge of so-called "free-fire zones" or any obligation to modify flight paths to take account of them.

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25. During the period under review the Nuclear Monitoring Group conducted more than 200 inspections at some 91 facilities, 28 of which had not previously been inspected. In the period since the last report to the Council, the IAEA has not detected in Iraq activities, equipment or materials proscribed by Security Council resolutions.

26. By letter dated 26 February 1997, Iraq provided a consolidated list of additions and revisions to its "full, final, and complete declaration" called for in Security Council resolution 707 (1991). The IAEA, assisted by Member State experts, is evaluating these additions and revisions to determine whether their incorporation into the current (third) draft of the FFCD will provide an acceptably comprehensive declaration of Iraq's former nuclear weapons programme.

27. There are many examples of Iraq's continuing ability to import technological equipment, although no instances have been detected where Iraq has not fulfilled its obligations under the OMV Plan or under the export/import regime established under UN Security Council resolution 1051 (1996).

28. It is essential that the difficulties currently being experienced with respect to the unrestricted rights of UNSCOM and IAEA to use fixed and rotary wing aircraft for overflights throughout Iraq ("for all relevant purposes, including inspection, surveillance, transportation and/or logistics" - paragraph 32 (d) OMV Plan) are quickly and unambiguously resolved. Regardless of any other considerations, Iraq's obstruction of these rights make it impossible to consider the ongoing monitoring and verification plan to be fully operational.

29. In discharging the tasks assigned to it, the IAEA continues to benefit from the strong support of the Council and from the assistance of Member States through the secondment of cost-free experts, the access to advanced technologies, and the provision of information and technical advice.

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ORIGINAL: RUSSIAN

LETTER DATED 9 APRIL 1997 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVES OF KAZAKSTAN, KYRGYZSTAN, THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, TAJIKISTAN AND UZBEKISTAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

We have the honour to transmit herewith the text of a joint statement issued by the Consultative Meeting of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan concerning a settlement of the situation in Tajikistan and Afghanistan, adopted in Dushanbe on 5 April 1997 (see annex).

We should be grateful if you would have the text of this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) A. ARYSTANBEKOVA
Permanent Representative of
the Republic of Kazakstan
to the United Nations

(Signed) Z. ESHMAMBETOVA
Permanent Representative of
the Kyrgyz Republic to the
United Nations

(Signed) S. LAVROV
Permanent Representative of
the Russian Federation to the
United Nations

(Signed) R. ALIMOV
Permanent Representative of
the Republic of Tajikistan
to the United Nations

(Signed) A. VOHIDOV
Acting Permanent Representative
of the Republic of Uzbekistan
to the United Nations

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Annex

Joint statement adopted in Dushanbe on 5 April 1997 by the Consultative Meeting of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan

The Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, meeting in Dushanbe on 5 April 1997, discussed the current state and prospects for the further development of bilateral and multilateral relations among the countries that took in that meeting, and also held an exchange of views on various aspects of a political settlement of the inter-Tajik conflict.

The participants in the meeting noted that traditional economic, humanitarian and other ties were conducive to the further development of effective bilateral and multilateral cooperation. In this regard, they underscored the importance of integration and closer relations within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the Single Economic Area of the Central Asian Countries.

The participants in the meeting expressed their support for the efforts of the leaders of Tajikistan and the United Tajik Opposition to continue to stabilize the situation in the Republic and achieve national accord. Noting the significant progress that has recently been made in the inter-Tajik talks being held under United Nations auspices, they emphasized the need for the strict implementation by the Tajik parties of the agreements that have been reached and for continued progress in the negotiations. In this regard, they noted the importance of constructive and effective work by the delegations of the Tajik parties at the forthcoming round of talks in Tehran.

The Ministers for Foreign Affairs welcomed the proposal to hold a meeting in Moscow between the President of Tajikistan and the leader of the United Tajik Opposition for the signing of a final general agreement on peace and national accord in Tajikistan.

In the spirit of the joint statement on Tajikistan adopted on 28 March 1997 at a meeting of the CIS Council of Heads of State (see S/1997/268, annex IV), the participants in the meeting stressed that their countries intended to continue to promote in every way possible a peaceful settlement of the Tajik conflict and provide economic and humanitarian assistance to Tajikistan.

They reaffirmed their readiness to contribute to the practical implementation of inter-Tajik agreements on a whole series of military issues. They agreed to speed up the joint elaboration of questions relating to the use for this purpose of the Collective Peacekeeping Forces and a contingent of border troops from CIS countries in Tajikistan.

In their consideration of issues relating to a Tajik settlement, the participants in the meeting expressed their concern at the continuing armed confrontation in Afghanistan and the threat of a further escalation of the

inter-Afghan conflict. They reaffirmed the position of their States in favour of an immediate cessation of hostilities, the conflicting sides' search for ways to reach agreement, and the implementation of United Nations resolutions on Afghanistan. The participants in the meeting declared their countries' readiness to continue to cooperate closely in the interest of safeguarding the external borders of Commonwealth States, and called upon interested countries to take active measures to promote a political settlement of the Afghan problem.

(Signed) K. K. TOKAEV
Minister for Foreign Affairs
of the Republic of Kazakstan

(Signed) B. N. PASTUKHOV
First Deputy Minister for
Foreign Affairs of the
Russian Federation

(Signed) R. I. OTUNBAEV
Minister for Foreign Affairs
of the Kyrgyz Republic

(Signed) T. N. NAZAROV
Minister for Foreign Affairs
of the Republic of Tajikistan

(Signed) A. H. KAMILOV
Minister for Foreign Affairs
of the Republic of Uzbekistan

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1997/299
10 April 1997
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 9 APRIL 1997 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you that 3,863 bombs, missiles and other ordnance left behind by the 1991 30-Power aggression against Iraq were found and disposed of in all parts of the country between 1 February and 31 March 1997. The items included American-made cluster bombs as well as spherical bombs, strip bombs, spindle bombs and air-launched dispensers.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

97-09697 (E) 140497 140497 150497

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1997/300
10 April 1997
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 10 APRIL 1997 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you as follows:

1. On 22 February 1997 two Kuwaiti Coast Guard vessels seized an Iraqi fishing boat with five Iraqis on board. The fishing boat was at the time 100 metres inside Iraqi territorial waters in the area between Mina' al-Bakr and Mina' al-Amayah. The Iraqis thus abducted were: Wujdan Majid Abd al-Aziz; Qusayy Khalil Ibrahim Khalil; Ahmad Shakir Sharri; Muhammad Abbud Rahim; and Abd al-Azim Mansur Ali.

2. At 0730 hours on 9 March 1997 near buoy 15 a Kuwaiti helicopter hovered very low over the Iraqi tug Hamdan and engaged in acts of provocation.

I request you to intervene with Kuwait with a view to ensuring the safety of the Iraqis involved and securing their immediate return to Iraq together with their boat and in order to induce Kuwait to desist from these repeated acts of aggression and provocation. These actions are incompatible with the Charter of the United Nations and the norms of public international law given that they are in flagrant violation of the sovereignty of a State Member of the United Nations and constitute a serious offence against its nationals. In accordance with the principle of State responsibility, I also affirm the right of the Republic of Iraq to seek compensation for all the damage caused to its nationals and its property by these unwarranted actions.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1997/301
11 April 1997

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

1. The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the Security Council a report submitted by the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission, established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Security Council resolution 687 (1991).

2. The present report is the third report by the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission following the adoption of Security Council resolution 1051 (1996) of 27 March 1996, in which, in paragraph 16, the Council called for the consolidation of the reports required under the Council's resolutions 699 (1991) of 17 June 1991 and 715 (1991) of 11 October 1991.[1] The report covers the period from 11 October 1996 to 11 April 1997.

Notes

[1] The Commission's 20 previous reports are: S/23165, S/23268, S/23801, S/24108 and Corr.1, S/24661, S/24984, S/25620, S/25977, S/26684, S/26910, S/1994/489, S/1994/750, S/1994/1138 and Corr.1, S/1994/1422 and Add.1, S/1995/284, S/1995/494, S/1995/864, S/1995/1038, S/1996/258 and S/1996/848.

Annex

Report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the Special Commission established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of resolution 687 (1991)

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is the third report by the Special Commission following the adoption of resolution 1051 (1996) of 27 March 1996. It is a consolidated report addressing all aspects of the Commission's work, under resolutions 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991, 707 (1991) of 15 August 1991, 715 (1991) of 11 October 1991, 1051 (1996) of 27 March 1996 and 1060 (1996) of 12 June 1996.

2. The report covers the period from 11 October 1996 to 11 April 1997. During the period, the Executive Chairman briefed the Council in the months of October and December 1996 and March 1997 on developments in the Commission's work. In addition, the Chairman has held numerous meetings with groups of Council members and individual members.

3. The Commission has continued with the implementation of the mandate laid down in paragraphs 8, 9 and 10 of section C of resolution 687 (1991) and subsequent relevant resolutions of the Council. That mandate has two specific parts: first to identify and dispose of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction in the chemical and biological areas, its long-range missiles and related capabilities in all proscribed areas; and, secondly, to create and operate a system of ongoing monitoring of Iraq's compliance with its obligation not to acquire proscribed weapons and capabilities. Furthermore, the Commission continues to be responsible for designating locations not declared by Iraq for inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the nuclear field, in providing support to IAEA inspections in Iraq and certain other services called for by the relevant resolutions.

II. DEVELOPMENTS

4. After its acceptance of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) in April 1991, the Government of Iraq initiated a policy of systematic concealment, denial and masking of the most important aspects of its proscribed weapons and related capabilities. In the face of this challenge, the Commission has had to field innovative and creative inspections, planned, organized and executed in a manner capable of defeating Iraqi countermeasures. The inspection activities and the integrated analytical work, supported by advanced techniques and applied science, have since 1991 led to the uncovering of the full dimensions of Iraq's complex programmes for weapons of mass destruction. During the last two years only, the inspections have led to the unmasking of: a complete biological weapons development and production programme; highly sophisticated and advanced work on the extremely lethal chemical warfare nerve agent VX; and the multifaceted domestic development and production of Scud-type missile engines under Iraq's project 1728. Large quantities of chemical weapons and equipment, as well as long-range missiles and related precision machines, have been destroyed under the Commission's supervision in the implementation of resolution 687 (1991). As late as 1996, after the detection of the secret biological weapons programme, the sprawling research, development and production facility for biological weapons at Al Hakam was demolished.

5. These accomplishments demonstrate that international weapons inspections under the auspices of the United Nations, if applied with first-rate expertise and modern technology, can achieve effective results.

6. The Commission is continuing its work as it cannot state that Iraq has accounted for all weapons, components and capabilities proscribed under section C of resolution 687 (1991). In most cases when confronted by the Commission, Iraq admits the acquisition of such items through import or production. However, Iraq maintains that it itself has destroyed many of them, mostly in 1991 and 1992, in undeclared and secret campaigns. These have been conducted in contravention of resolution 687 (1991), in which the Council calls for all such destruction to be carried out under international supervision by the Commission. In addition, Iraq's policy of concealment, described in detail in the Commission's report of 11 October 1996 (S/1996/848), was aimed at deceiving the inspectors and at retaining limited but significant proscribed capabilities.

7. Since spring 1996, the Commission has carried out a series of unprecedented inspections aimed at detecting the concealment mechanism and getting access to proscribed weapons, components, production tools and related documents that might still remain in Iraq. All these activities are in conformity with the joint programme of action agreed upon on 22 June 1996 between the Executive Chairman and the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq, where unilateral undeclared destruction, the provision of documents and the concealment measures, as well as the attainment of a material balance in each weapons area, were defined as priority tasks.

8. Security Council resolutions 687 and 707 (1991) require Iraq to provide declarations containing its full, final and complete disclosures of its proscribed chemical, biological and missile programmes, and the Commission then to verify them. However, the inadequacies, incompleteness and lack of evidentiary documentation in many areas of Iraq's various declarations over the years have not allowed for credible verification by the Commission. This has constituted one of the main reasons for the delay in clearing up matters related to Iraq's programmes for weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles, thus preventing the Commission from reporting to the Security Council under paragraph 22 of resolution 687 (1991) that, in its view, Iraq has completed all actions contemplated in section C of that resolution. In an effort to expedite the verification process, and to assist Iraq in identifying where further action on its part is required, an innovative process was agreed upon by the Deputy Prime Minister and the Executive Chairman, by which the Commission presents to Iraq, at the political level, its detailed findings and assessment of the outstanding problems. This process started in the December 1996 meeting at Baghdad between the Deputy Prime Minister and the Chairman, during which missile issues were addressed. It was followed by similar discussions in the chemical weapons area in February and April 1997, and in the biological weapons area in April 1997. Seminar-type meetings, associated with this process, were held at the technical level, with the participation of Iraqi experts and teams of international experts from the Commission.

9. This process requires both a detailed and systematic presentation on the part of the Commission, and a similar and verifiable response by Iraq. The

Commission believes that it has led to a much clearer understanding, at the level of Iraq's political leadership, of what the problems are and what Iraq is required to do to endeavour to resolve them. The Commission's hope was that by creating this direct link between the political and technical levels, the lack of progress on essential technical issues may be overcome. In essence, the goal is to force Iraq's political statements of full cooperation into becoming a reality at the technical level. Tangible results have already been achieved in the missile and chemical areas. Because of particular deficiencies in the biological weapons declaration, addressed in detail later in this report, it has not yet been possible to apply the process in full to this area. However, Iraq has recently accepted the Commission's proposal to work jointly at the expert level to prepare a new declaration in the biological area. It should be accompanied by the relevant documentation necessary for its credible verification. The Commission is using all its resources and efforts to expedite the verification process, achieve material balances and clarify the outstanding issues with the aim of being able to report to the Council under paragraph 22 of resolution 687 (1991). The results achieved so far during the last six months indicate that the new process constitutes a fruitful approach, which should expedite matters, if Iraq is fully cooperative and transparent in its response to the Commission's initiatives and concerns.

A. Relations with Iraq

10. The provisions of the joint statement of 22 June 1996, and the joint programme of action of the same date, call for a bimonthly political level meeting between Iraq and the Commission at Baghdad to review progress and direct further effort. The first of these meetings in the period under review took place from 19 to 21 October 1996. The Chairman's visit followed on his briefing of the Council on the Commission's six-monthly report that had been submitted on 11 October (S/1996/848).

11. The Chairman held plenary meetings with Mr. Tariq Aziz, the Deputy Prime Minister, and a large Iraqi delegation. In the main, the meetings focused on discussion of the Commission's October report. The Commission's side explained the reasons for its continuing concerns over various aspects of its mandate which had not been completed and pointed out that, on the basis of information provided by Iraq, it could not yet determine that all proscribed weapons, components and materials had been disposed of as Iraq had claimed. With this in mind, the Chairman continued to press the Iraqi side to provide more information, particularly documentation, to support its declarations required under resolutions 687, 707 and 715 (1991) and presented to the Commission in June and July 1996. However, the Iraqi side did little to deal with the outstanding concerns but instead dwelt on areas where it considered that the Commission's characterization of the situation in its October report had been overly negative. No progress was made on issues of substance. The Deputy Prime Minister acknowledged that more work was needed and that the degree of cooperation reached at the political level had to be translated into concrete results at the technical and operational levels.

12. As a result of agreement during the Chairman's visit to Baghdad during October 1996, the Deputy Executive Chairman paid a visit to Baghdad in November

to discuss the ongoing monitoring and verification system and ways in which its functioning could be improved. The Commission's team presented general points of principle as well as specific areas of growing concern regarding Iraq's cooperation in the monitoring operations. The Iraqi side outlined areas in which it had specific requests of the Commission. Iraq gave some commitments to improve its ongoing monitoring and verification declarations. The Commission is seeking to simplify the formats for the declarations.

13. The Chairman's next bimonthly visit to Baghdad took place from 8 to 11 December 1996. He made a presentation that included details of what the Commission knew of the disposition of prohibited missiles and pointed to the fact that the missiles that Iraq had acknowledged importing had not all been accounted for by Iraq. The Commission's experts demonstrated that none of the variety of analyses of information provided by Iraq produced a zero material balance of the proscribed missiles known to have existed at the end of the Gulf War. Furthermore, there were many other outstanding issues, including the rationale for the programme of secret destruction by Iraq and its recently admitted diversion of missiles, components and production tools, even during this destruction. In his response, the Deputy Prime Minister acknowledged that there were some issues where Iraq could do more to support its declaration that all proscribed missiles had been destroyed and undertook that it would further address the Commission's concerns.

14. The Chairman made it clear to the Iraqi side that its refusal to permit the removal from Iraq of missile remnants for analysis by the Commission (described in paras. 41-44) was a violation of the Commission's rights and a serious impediment in accounting for the proscribed missiles. However, Iraq continued to block the removal of the remnants. On 17 December, the Chairman wrote to the Deputy Prime Minister setting out his assessment of the meetings and again called on Iraq, in keeping with its obligations, to release the missile remnants. This letter was distributed to the members of the Council.

15. The Chairman next visited Baghdad from 20 to 23 February 1997. In addition to the remaining missile issues, the two sides began addressing the outstanding issues in the chemical weapons area. The Chairman explained the basis for the Commission's concerns that Iraq had still not provided a full and correct account of its chemical weapons programme. He, inter alia, addressed the production of the nerve agent VX, missing documents, unaccounted-for warheads, bombs and munitions and undeclared chemical weapons production equipment. The Deputy Prime Minister undertook to address the Commission's concerns, in part through the provision of written answers. It was agreed that a follow-up expert-level meeting would be held in March.

16. During the February meetings, Iraq provided further clarifications on the outstanding missile issues. There was some progress on the basic accounting, mainly cross-checking serial numbers and other data to ensure that both sides were working from the same premise. However, not much emerged on important problems such as concealment of missiles after the war and their unilateral destruction. A further issue addressed by the Chairman was Iraq's continuing refusal to let the Commission remove the remnants of destroyed missiles as called for in the statement by the President of the Security Council of 30 December 1996 (S/PRST/1996/49). The Deputy Prime Minister sought to have

Iraqi personnel involved in the Commission's investigation and analysis of the remnants. The Chairman ruled that out. Ultimately, Iraq agreed to the removal of the remnants for out-of-country analysis. At the end of the meetings, on 23 February 1997, the two sides agreed on a joint statement (S/1997/152) describing the arrangements for the removal, the main results of the visit and the plans for the immediate future.

17. On 2 March 1997, the Chairman held a meeting in New York with Mr. Mohammed Saeed Al-Sahaf, Iraq's Minister for Foreign Affairs. The two sides agreed that a relationship based on cooperation was the best way for resolving outstanding issues. The Chairman raised some problems that the Commission had recently encountered in conducting its monitoring operations in Iraq, as described in paragraphs 26-29.

18. On 3 April 1997, during the next bimonthly meeting at Baghdad, the Chairman gave an update on the Commission's analysis of the removed missile remnants. The work on the items considered to be a priority had already begun. However, the programme would require several weeks or months before it was completed.

19. In the chemical area, progress was made on how to handle certain of the problem areas; principally Iraq's remaining potential in the chemical weapons area and the availability of proscribed weapons. The Deputy Prime Minister stated that Iraq did not conceal chemical weapons of any kind nor precursors for such weapons. He acknowledged that Iraq had carried out destruction without the mandatory prior notification to the Commission and that this destruction had to be accounted for. He argued that the lack of an explanation for such activities and supporting documents should not be used by the Commission as the basis for suspicions that Iraq was still concealing prohibited items. The Chairman outlined actions that the Commission would take in the coming two months in an effort to expedite verification of outstanding issues. The Deputy Prime Minister made an appeal for the chemical weapons file to be closed by early June 1997. The Chairman made it clear that the issues that he had identified had to be addressed thoroughly and stressed the need for Iraq's account to be backed up with documentation that would substantiate the truth.

20. The Chairman restated the Commission's contention that more documents concerning Iraq's proscribed weapons programmes still existed in Iraq in all areas. Those received so far came, in the main, from Iraq's field facilities. More documentation should be available from the central Government organs such as the Military Industrialization Corporation, the Ministry of Defence and the Office of the Presidency. He made a formal request for the documentation, which would considerably help with the verification of Iraq's declarations. The Iraqi side undertook to search for more documents, stating that there was no policy to withhold information and that when documents were discovered they were given to the Commission.

21. The Chairman presented the status of the verification in the biological area. He made it clear that Iraq's declaration, presented to the Commission in June 1996, did not provide a basis for proper verification as it contained many gaps and inconsistencies. He asked that the Iraqi side reconsider its position and provide the Commission with a new declaration that gave a full and accurate account of its biological weapons programme. He indicated that the Commission

would work actively with Iraq's experts to that end. At the meeting, Iraq stated that, in response to the Chairman's presentation, it would not present anything new but would reiterate the data in its June 1996 declaration. The Deputy Prime Minister stated that, while Iraq's account was accurate, he agreed that further work was needed in the biological weapons area. He made a formal statement that Iraq did not conceal any biological warfare agents or any materials that could be used as a biological weapon. Subsequently, in a letter dated 5 April 1997, the Deputy Prime Minister communicated Iraq's agreement to the Chairman's proposals regarding a new declaration in the biological area.

22. The two sides discussed problems that had arisen in the conduct of ongoing monitoring and verification (see paras. 26-29). The Chairman stressed the seriousness with which the Commission viewed Iraq's actions, which had included threats that had been made to the safety of the Commission's helicopter operations. The Commission had noticed efforts by Iraq to undercut the effectiveness of monitoring through a variety of tactics. The Chairman warned that Iraq's deteriorating performance called into question its commitment to the monitoring process and that if the trend were not reversed it could result in a situation with political consequences whereby monitoring could no longer be considered operational. The Deputy Prime Minister stated formally that Iraq had no objection to the basis of the monitoring process nor a philosophical disagreement with its aims. Iraq was committed to ongoing monitoring and verification and that would not change. It was the cornerstone of Iraq's policy to ask the Security Council to implement paragraph 22 of resolution 687 (1991). The Deputy Prime Minister said that Iraq's aim was to have the monitoring process proceed correctly to the full satisfaction of the Commission, IAEA and the Security Council. Lieutenant General Amer Rashid, the Minister of Oil, addressed issues relating to the practical aspects of monitoring activities and put forward some suggestions. That was done in a constructive spirit and was welcomed by the Chairman.

B. Ongoing monitoring and verification

23. The establishment and effective functioning of a system for ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with its obligations is a necessary condition if the Commission is to be able to report to the Council under paragraph 22 of resolution 687 (1991). The task facing the Commission requires it to monitor throughout Iraq sites and facilities with equipment capable of producing proscribed weapons as well as to watch for clandestine sites that may be created for proscribed activities. Thus, for the monitoring system to be effective, it must cast a broad net and cover major facilities such as petrochemical and biopesticide plants where chemical or biological warfare agents could be produced. However, such agents can also be clandestinely produced by Iraq in such facilities as breweries, brake fluid factories and even university microbiology laboratories containing permitted dual-use equipment. Therefore, those facilities must also be covered. The Commission now regularly monitors over 300 sites in Iraq.

24. Since April 1995, the Commission has had a system of ongoing monitoring in place in Iraq in all areas falling within its competence. The system comprises a variety of interlocking and overlapping processes involving on-site inspection

by resident teams, aerial inspections and a variety of remote sensing capabilities, including cameras and chemical detectors.

25. The effectiveness of the monitoring system is dependent on several factors. Among the more important are the completeness and accuracy of the declarations required from Iraq under the monitoring plans. The system is also based on the premise that the Commission has a clear understanding of the scope and history of Iraq's proscribed weapons programmes. Only then can the Commission have confidence that it is indeed monitoring all required locations and activities.

26. As noted in the Commission's previous report to the Council (S/1996/848), Iraq's behaviour and uneven compliance has had a negative effect on monitoring confidence. The last six months have seen a pattern of efforts on the part of Iraq to restrict the Commission's monitoring activities.

27. Iraq's monitoring declarations should be considerably improved. It appears that the problems in the compilation of the monitoring declarations rests not with the facilities providing the raw data, but with Iraq's National Monitoring Directorate, the governmental agency established as the interface for the Commission's work. The Commission has often discovered that facilities have provided accurate information to the National Monitoring Directorate but this information has then been manipulated so that the monitoring declarations presented to the Commission are misleading and inaccurate. Iraq has further failed to provide information about all sites and facilities where declarable equipment of a dual-use nature is located. During the period under review, the Commission's teams have inspected sites where several hundred pieces of dual-use equipment have not been declared.

28. One of the tasks of the National Monitoring Directorate is to provide minders who travel with the Commission's inspection teams to ensure that they are granted immediate and unconditional access to the sites under monitoring. The National Monitoring Directorate has sought to constrain the Commission's activities by restricting the times and days during which it would respond to requests for minders. When minders from the National Monitoring Directorate escort the Commission's inspectors, they have often interrupted interviews and instructed Iraqi site personnel to provide wrong information or to refuse to answer relevant questions.

29. Iraq has further sought to constrain monitoring activities by implementing a new policy whereby instructions have been issued to all sites and facilities that access be refused to the inspectors unless representatives of the National Monitoring Directorate are present. In another disturbing trend, Iraq has tried to enforce new procedures that seek to require prior approval from the National Monitoring Directorate for the provision of documents found by inspectors at sites. These violations of the Commission's rights have been protested by the Chairman in a series of letters to senior Iraqi officials and to the Deputy Prime Minister and were raised with him by the Chairman during his bimonthly meetings.

30. These are serious problems and the Commission will continue to work with Iraq to achieve the objectives of the monitoring system. However, long-term prospects for continued monitoring confidence depend on Iraq's commitment to

carrying out its responsibilities and obligations under the monitoring plan. Early attention on the part of Iraq to these failures and strict discipline in carrying out its obligations is needed now, and on a continuous basis. The Commission very much hopes that the commitments given by the Deputy Prime Minister during the Chairman's visit to Baghdad in April 1997 will be translated into action.

C. Aerial operations

31. During the period under review serious incidents have occurred in respect of the Commission's aerial operations. It will be recalled that the Commission has the right, under the Council's resolutions and related texts, to conduct both fixed-wing and helicopter flights throughout Iraq for all relevant purposes, including inspection, surveillance, aerial surveys, transportation and logistics without interference of any kind and upon such terms and conditions as may be determined by the Special Commission. These rights can only be changed by the Council. Iraq's violations have encompassed attempts to exclude significant areas from overflight and refusal to provide landing rights and refuelling, and threats to the safety and integrity of the aircraft and their crews. Iraq's actions have also included, on repeated occasions, threats to shoot down the Commission's aircraft if it did not follow the route Iraq wished it to fly. In other incidents, the Iraqi helicopter has flown dangerously close to the Commission's aircraft to force it to deviate from its planned route and Iraqi personnel on board the Commission's aircraft have attempted to wrest control of the aircraft.

32. The Chairman raised these issues during the meetings in Baghdad in February and later, on 14 March 1997, he wrote to the Deputy Prime Minister protesting Iraq's actions. On 16 March 1997, the Deputy Prime Minister responded to the Chairman's letter. He stated that Iraq had been cooperating with the Commission's operations and that the recent incidents should not be construed as an intentional pattern aimed at constraining the Commission's work. He informed the Commission that he had instructed the officials concerned to avoid any reoccurrence.

33. During the Chairman's April visit to Baghdad, the issues were again addressed. Both sides acknowledged that full account had to be taken of the Commission's rights and Iraq's legitimate defence concerns. The discussions were constructive and arrangements were arrived at to give practical effect to the above rights and concerns.

D. Export/import monitoring mechanism

34. The export/import monitoring mechanism, jointly operated by the Commission and IAEA, has now been fully operational for six months. During that period, Iraq and the Governments of suppliers have provided a number of notifications of the intended and actual export to Iraq of items identified in the annexes to the plans of the Commission and IAEA for ongoing monitoring and verification.

35. The introduction of the full export/import monitoring system, prior to the easing or lifting of sanctions, has been of great value in testing the system in practice, particularly in respect of operations inside Iraq. The infrastructure necessary to ensure the commercial confidentiality of information provided under the mechanism has been established.

36. The resident export/import monitoring group continues to undertake inspections in Iraq, frequently in conjunction with experts from other monitoring teams. In November 1996, a third export/import non-resident team, UNSCOM 165, undertook inspections at a number of sites to gain further information on import procedures.

E. National implementation measures

37. The plans for ongoing monitoring and verification require Iraq to enact into its national legislation a prohibition for all natural and legal persons under its jurisdiction or control from undertaking anywhere any activity that is prohibited for Iraq by resolutions 687 and 707 (1991), by other related Council resolutions or by the monitoring plans. Iraq must also enact penal legislation to be enforced against such individuals who violate that prohibition. These provisions are essentially similar in character to those accepted by the 70 or so States currently parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction.

38. In the period under review there has been no progress in obtaining from Iraq compliance with its obligations in this regard. Whenever it is raised with Iraqi representatives, it is said in response that these measures give rise to no problem on Iraq's part and that it will proceed to enact the necessary legislation. The enactment of the necessary legislation is clearly one of the steps that Iraq is required to take in terms of paragraph 22 of resolution 687 (1991) before the Commission can report to the Council under that paragraph.

F. Analysis of missile remnants

39. As part of efforts to clarify outstanding issues, the Commission decided to carry out in-depth laboratory analysis on remnants of proscribed missiles. The main objective of this mission was to obtain solid data on quantities of missiles disposed of, in particular through Iraq's secret destruction in 1991. A team (UNSCOM 158) was despatched to Iraq in early November 1996 to conduct the excavation and removal from Iraq of the missile remnants. In that context, arrangements had been made with a Government to support the Commission in its analytical activity at a specialized facility.

40. The UNSCOM 158 mission was scheduled to take place in advance of the mid-December 1996 meeting between the Deputy Prime Minister and the Chairman, during which it had earlier been agreed that there would be a particular focus on attempting to settle outstanding problems in the missile accounting. It was hoped that some of the major findings of the analysis would aid the December

meetings with final results to be incorporated in the Commission's report due in April 1997.

41. Excavation activities commenced at the site of the burial of the remnants on 6 November 1996. The team and Iraq's representatives recorded, both photographically and in video form, all items excavated. Preliminary on-site evaluation of the excavated material was carried out in a joint fashion by the Commission's experts and their Iraqi counterparts. By 14 November, approximately half of the remnants had been removed from the excavation site and had been transported to the Commission's Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre for preparation for removal from the country. At that time, Lt. General Amer Rashid contacted the Chief Inspector and suddenly stated that Iraq would not allow the Commission to remove the excavated items from the country.

42. On 15 November, the Chairman was contacted by Lt. General Amer Rashid. The Chairman told him that Iraq's actions were a clear violation of the terms of resolution 687 (1991). The Chairman noted that it was not technically feasible to conduct such laboratory work inside Iraq, as had been suggested by Iraq, owing to the lack of adequate technical facilities and capabilities in the country. He reiterated the Commission's intention to share with Iraq the results of the investigation of the items that the Commission planned to remove.

43. In a telephone conversation on 16 November, Lt. General Amer Rashid made it clear to the Chairman that the Iraqi side was not prepared to change its position and that the matter should await his next visit to Baghdad. The Chairman made it plain to him (and later in a letter that day to the Deputy Prime Minister) that any delays in settling the issue of missiles were purely of Iraq's own making.

44. During the December 1996 meetings in Baghdad, Iraq stuck to its position and refused to allow the removal of the remnants. On 18 December the Chairman briefed the Council on the continuing impasse. Later that month, on 30 December, the Council adopted a statement by its President (S/PRST/1996/49), which, inter alia, deplored the refusal by Iraq to allow the Commission to remove the remnants for analysis.

45. Despite the Statement by the Council's President, Iraq continued to refuse to allow the removal of the remnants. During his visit to Baghdad in February 1997, the Chairman drew attention to the statement. After the protracted discussions, Iraq agreed that the missile remnants could be removed. This took place in early March 1997. The remnants are now undergoing analysis under the supervision of the Commission's teams in laboratories in France and the United States of America.

III. CONCLUSIONS

46. The accumulated effect of the work that has been accomplished over six years since the ceasefire went into effect, between Iraq and the Coalition, is such that not much is unknown about Iraq's retained proscribed weapons capabilities.

47. However, what is still not accounted for cannot be neglected. Even a limited inventory of long-range missiles would be a source of deep concern if those missiles were fitted with warheads filled with the most deadly of chemical nerve agents, VX. If one single missile warhead were filled with the biological warfare agent, Anthrax, many millions of lethal doses could be spread in an attack on any city in the region. With that in mind, the Special Commission has undertaken extraordinary efforts to bring to a satisfactory conclusion the full accounting of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles, in order to be able to make sure that all the proscribed items have been disposed of.

48. The present report describes the many activities carried out over the last six months to seek the full implementation of the mandate given to the Commission. It has been a period of intensive work. The priority issues set out in the joint programme of action of 22 June 1996 have been explored in full, with the difficult questions of secret destruction, provision of documents, concealment and material balance being in focus.

49. A fusion of technical expert work and the political dialogue on the level of the Deputy Prime Minister and the Executive Chairman has been tried. The purpose of turning their bimonthly meetings into a political/technical seminar, with the participation of the Commission's and Iraq's scientific and technical experts, has been to narrow the major outstanding issues to a manageable quantity. With regard to the missile and chemical weapons, the Commission has achieved this objective. More distant from clarity is the biological weapons area where Iraq's presentations are rather chaotic. To help to solve the deficiencies, an agreement was recently reached that both sides should work together in order to arrive at a well-structured declaration which could be a workable basis for the accomplishment of its verification.

50. During the period under review, Iraq has generally cooperated with visiting UNSCOM teams. A major exception has been Iraq's protracted refusal to permit the removal of missile remnants which the Commission, in the beginning of November 1996, had excavated for analysis abroad. This has meant a meaningless delay of four months and prevented a presentation on the issue to the Security Council in this report.

51. A prerequisite for the implementation of paragraph 22 of resolution 687 (1991) is that the Commission can report that the monitoring of Iraq's industrial, chemical and biological assets, to prevent the acquisition of proscribed weapons and related capabilities, is fully operational. While the system continues to function, certain actions by Iraq in seeking to impede and limit inspection activities and endanger aerial operations call into question Iraq's long-term intentions and constitute a challenge to the system as a whole.

52. The firm commitments made recently by the Deputy Prime Minister to maintain the monitoring system to the satisfaction of the Commission, IAEA and the Security Council, give rise to the hope that the deterioration will be reversed so that the system can again engender the required confidence to assure the international community that Iraq has not resumed prohibited weapons activities.

53. An important element in the acquisition by Iraq of the weapons of mass destruction has been the supplies and other support from abroad. Many Governments have gone to great lengths to give the Commission access to individuals, data and material having significance for the procurement efforts by Iraq. These contributions are helpful in accelerating the implementation of the Commission's mandate. A small number of Governments have chosen so far not to respond to the Commission's repeated and in some cases long-standing requests for information regarding procurement originating in their countries. Without such responses, the verification of certain parts of Iraq's proscribed programmes will be delayed. It would be most unfortunate, if for this reason, the Commission would not be able to report under paragraph 22 of resolution 687 (1991).

54. The assessment of Iraq's policy during the period under review must necessarily be somewhat contradictory. On the one side, Iraq has provided practically no new disclosures. On the other side, on the level of the Deputy Prime Minister, constructive efforts have been made to develop innovative procedures and methods to move forward, and to implement arrangements agreed upon between the two sides. A significant example in this regard is how recently inspectors working to map out Iraq's concealment activities were granted access for the inspection of sensitive sites, in accordance with the Commission's modalities.

55. A solid framework with tested procedures for effective work is in place. It is now time for Iraq to make full use of this and to provide the material and data to give substance to its stated commitment of full cooperation. The remaining problems are such that they cannot be solved through a technical process only. Their solution requires the major political decision by Iraq's leadership to give up, once and for all, all capabilities and ambition to retain or acquire the proscribed weapons. The Commission is well equipped in such an eventuality to act swiftly and effectively in carrying out its obligations. In the meantime, the Commission will continue its inspection activities exposing step-by-step the various elements of Iraq's weapons programmes.

Appendix I

Inspection activities and operational, administrative and other matters

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Inspection activities and operational, administrative and other matters

I. BIOLOGICAL ACTIVITIES

1. In June 1996, Iraq submitted what was stated to be its formal declaration containing its full, final and complete disclosure on the proscribed biological programme. The initial assessment of that document was provided in the Commission's October 1996 report (S/1996/848). Since then, five verification inspections, information obtained by the Commission and assessments by an international panel of experts have led the Commission to conclude that the June 1996 declaration fails to provide a complete and accurate account of the proscribed biological weapons programme.

2. Verification inspections were conducted in Iraq each month from October 1996 to March 1997. These inspections continued to uncover flaws in accounting for the biological weapons programme and evidence that Iraq is concealing significant aspects of that programme. The October inspection (UNSCOM 159) focused on field trials conducted by Iraq. Information from interviews, supported by documentation, indicates more field trials than have been acknowledged by Iraq. A disturbing incident, which occurred in October 1996, was an attempt during a break in an interview by a senior Iraqi official to convince the Iraqi expert being interviewed to change his statements.

3. In November 1996, an inspection team (UNSCOM 163) was unsuccessful in collecting samples of the biological warfare agents used in testing because of the apparent unwillingness of Iraq to identify the specific relevant locations. In December 1996, Iraq's declaration on the destruction of missile warheads which had been filled with biological agents, was the subject of verification. The Commission has clear evidence that such destruction did not take place at the location on the date declared by Iraq. Recent explanations provided by Iraq have not clarified the issue.

4. A mission in January 1997 (UNSCOM 169) attempted to verify declared production of bulk biological warfare agents. Inconsistencies in the declaration made such verification difficult. No documents have been provided to support Iraq's assertions that do not fit information otherwise known to the Commission. In several areas, essential personnel were not made available for interview. In the light of these problems, verification was impossible.

5. In February 1997, a team (UNSCOM 173) carried out excavation at one of the sites involved in the secret destruction. The excavation produced, amongst other remnants, three virtually intact bombs of the type Iraq declared as biological weapons. These bombs will be sampled by an expert team.

6. In February and March 1997, an inspection team (UNSCOM 174) attempted to establish the facts concerning Iraq's decision-making process aimed at concealing the biological weapons programme. As in January 1997, some key personnel, despite requests provided in advance, were not made available.

Attempts were made by some personnel interviewed to conceal the nature and scope of the relevant decisions taken.

7. In March 1997, the Commission convened an international panel of experts to review and assess the status of the declaration on the proscribed biological weapons programme. The experts concluded, inter alia, that Iraq had failed to report all imports of equipment and materials, in particular growth media. It had under-reported the production of bulk biological warfare agents. The stated production of aflatoxin could not have happened as declared. The declarations on destruction was not supported by sufficient evidence and it failed to provide a full accounting of procurement activities for the biological weapons programme.

8. During the April meetings in Baghdad, the Chairman made it clear that Iraq's June 1996 declaration did not provide a basis for proper verification activities. As mentioned in the main body of the report, Iraq agreed to the Chairman's proposal that a new declaration be prepared.

Monitoring activities

9. Eighty-six sites are currently under regular monitoring by the Commission's resident biological teams. In addition, the Commission sent specialized expert teams into Iraq to conduct inspections focusing on documents and equipment. Multi-disciplinary inspections were undertaken. Several pieces of significant undeclared equipment, spare parts and supplies were discovered during these inspections.

10. Iraq has still not declared all sites where dual-use biological equipment is present. The Commission's resident monitoring team continues to identify such sites that should have been declared by Iraq.

11. For several key biological sites, Iraq is required to provide, on a monthly basis, information on ongoing activities. On a number of occasions, Iraq did not provide the required information on changes which have been uncovered. Although the ongoing monitoring process started in April 1995, the monitoring team still finds discrepancies in what has been reported to the Commission.

II. CHEMICAL ACTIVITIES

12. During the period under review, the Commission's non-resident chemical teams have conducted four inspections. In December 1996, UNSCOM 170 conducted a sampling mission in Iraq in an effort to verify the secret destruction of chemical weapons-related compounds. Another team, UNSCOM 171, found significant amounts of empty dual-use munitions which Iraq had evaluated for use in its chemical weapons arsenal, but not declared to the Commission. Six such items have been removed to the Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre and will be transferred out of Iraq for further analysis.

13. The Commission's efforts to verify Iraq's declaration containing its full, final and complete disclosure in the chemical area, provided to the Commission in June 1996, have revealed that it contains inaccuracies and needs to be

completed in certain respects. After April 1991, Iraq retained parts of its chemical weapons capabilities, including equipment which it later declared to have been destroyed secretly or transferred for use in activities unrelated to proscribed purposes. However, the Commission has not been able to verify the secret destruction and has found that certain capabilities, contrary to Iraq's assertions, had actually been used in its chemical weapons programme.

14. With respect to the special warheads for proscribed missiles, both produced for chemical and biological weapons, Iraq has still not provided a credible account on quantities and types of warheads produced, the time-frame for their production and filling, and the alleged secret destruction. The Commission has evidence that Iraq has provided incorrect information in this respect. From the analysis of documents, obtained through inspections, the Commission has found that not all chemical bombs have yet been declared by Iraq. Thus, the accounting for chemical munitions remains unsolved.

15. The final disposition of the programme for the production of the highly lethal nerve agent VX remains unresolved. Iraq denied VX activities until 1995 when it was confronted by evidence presented by the Commission. Even following on its admission, Iraq still understates its achievements in the production of VX, asserting that it only carried out such VX activities on the laboratory/pilot plant scale. It claims to have secretly destroyed hundreds of tons of VX precursors in 1991. The Commission has evidence that Iraq obtained the technology and retains equipment for the large-scale production of VX.

16. Dual-use equipment which had been employed in the production of chemical weapons and analytical equipment to ensure the quality control of chemical warfare agents produced, is another area of concern. Several pieces of such equipment still remain in Iraq.

17. Iraq has admitted that, during the summer of 1988, a major decision to improve its chemical weapons capabilities was taken at the highest level. In the absence of some essential documentation, the Commission does not have a comprehensive understanding of the extent and aims of the chemical weapons programme in its later phase. This affects the monitoring regime.

18. Iraq has not disclosed "know-how" documentation, such as chemical weapons production manuals, and commercial contracts for Iraq's chemical weapons programme. The Commission can only conclude that they are being retained in order to resume proscribed production.

19. The Chairman brought the above concerns to the attention of the Deputy Prime Minister at the meeting in February 1997. During the discussions, the Deputy Prime Minister acknowledged that Iraq needed to address the Commission's concerns and promised to clarify some of the problems. Subsequently, Iraq provided some written clarifications. At the end of March 1997, a team of international chemical experts held technical talks with the Iraqi side, in preparation for the visit of the Chairman to Baghdad in April. The Chairman and the Deputy Prime Minister discussed the results of the technical level meeting. The Chairman underlined the importance of resolving the limited number of outstanding issues and urged Iraq to provide the necessary clarifications together with verifiable evidence. Iraq undertook to respond.

Monitoring activities

20. Since its establishment in October 1994, the resident chemical monitoring group has conducted over 550 inspections. Some 150 facilities in Iraq are being regularly inspected. The current multinational group consists of 11 inspectors and laboratory technicians with backgrounds in analytical chemistry, process chemistry, explosive ordnance disposal, and chemical weapons production.

21. The Commission recently deployed an Open-path Fourier Transform Infrared Spectrometer air monitoring system to collect infrared spectral signatures at a number of industrial facilities and chemical storage sites. This remote-sensing technology will assist the Commission by adding to its baseline monitoring information as well as to the historical database of emission activities.

22. On 16 January 1997, Iraq provided its semi-annual chemical declaration required under the plan for ongoing monitoring and verification. Some improvement has been noted by comparison with the previous declaration but it still does not meet the established requirements in full.

23. The Commission's monitoring teams have discovered some 200 key pieces of undeclared dual-use equipment, such as heat exchangers, glass reactor vessels and distillation columns capable of use in proscribed chemical weapons activities. Also about 800 pieces of related equipment have been located. These discoveries point to the fact that Iraq is not meeting in full its requirements with respect to reporting on its holdings of dual-use equipment.

III. MISSILE ACTIVITIES

24. During the reporting period, the Commission has continued its efforts to verify Iraq's declaration containing its full, final and complete disclosure in the missile area submitted in July 1996. Key outstanding issues were discussed at two rounds of political level talks held between the Deputy Prime Minister and the Chairman. During the December round, the Commission presented in great detail its concerns which focused on the accounting of Iraq's proscribed operational missile assets. As a result of the Commission's investigations, it had become apparent that Iraq had not presented sufficient evidence to account for the destruction of all proscribed missiles. Iraq's declarations on the secret destruction were inconsistent with facts established by the Commission. In an attempt to mislead the Commission, Iraq had tried to falsify evidence of this destruction. The Commission's investigations have also revealed a number of other areas requiring additional explanation and clarification. The Chairman stressed the Commission's concerns on Iraq's decision to conduct the secret destruction of the proscribed operational missiles assets in 1991 in violation of resolution 687 (1991). In particular, these concerns related to the political decisions taken to carry out such destruction, dissemination of follow-up orders and the actual implementation of these orders. In a letter of 4 November 1996, the Chairman requested Iraq to provide specific documentation related to the secret destruction in order to speed up effective verification. So far no response has been received from Iraq.

25. The arguments put forward by Iraq at the December meetings, which were aimed at proving that it had already accounted for all proscribed operational missile assets, were not satisfactory. The Deputy Prime Minister acknowledged that further work needed to be done by Iraq and suggested that the issue be discussed again during the next round of political level talks in February 1997.

26. During the February talks, Iraq presented its explanations which enabled further progress in the accounting for proscribed missiles. Iraq offered new clarifications on the numbers of missiles and missile launchers that had been secretly destroyed in 1991 as well as on the procedures and methods used. After the February round, in response to the Commission's request, Iraq presented new explanations on the material balance in such areas as missile fuels and missile guidance systems. These will be the subject of further verification. The Commission still awaits a report on the sites of the secret destruction and the provision of documentation in response to its specific requests.

27. In order to obtain solid data on the destroyed missiles, the Commission decided to excavate the remnants for technical analysis. After a prolonged delay described in the main body of the present report, on 23 February 1997, Iraq finally agreed to the removal of the remnants. The Commission then convened a seminar of international experts from 17 to 21 March 1997. The seminar was attended by representatives of national laboratories that offered to perform technical analysis, as well as experts who form the Commission's supervisory teams at these laboratories. The seminar participants conducted an examination of every engine to determine specific taskings for each laboratory. The seminar worked out procedures for speedy and effective analysis of the missile remnants and established practical modalities for the Commission's supervision of this work. The analytical work started in the United States and French laboratories, on 24 March and 7 April 1997, respectively. The Commission believes that this technical analysis will provide valuable data for verification of methods and procedures for the secret destruction, shed light on Iraq's efforts to produce missile engines and their components, and thus help to resolve the issues related to the counting of missiles.

28. Separately, the excavation of missile remnants was resumed in January 1997, under the supervision of a new team (UNSCOM 177). This time the search was extended to the declared sites of the secret destruction. As a result of this two-month long effort, an additional four complete engines were found that had not previously been presented by Iraq to the Commission. This discovery proved that the Commission's assessment at the December meetings that not all engines had been accounted for and presented for verification, was correct.

29. The Commission continued its inspections to verify Iraq's full, final and complete disclosure submitted in July 1996. Pursuant to the joint programme of action of 22 June 1996, this effort focused on material balances regarding missiles and related materials, as well as specialized tools used in Iraq's production of prohibited missiles. In order to verify the material balance, the Commission sought to establish the "chain of custody" that would account for relevant items in the period of time after the adoption of resolution 687 (1991) until the time when Iraq declared that the items had been destroyed. Owing to the lack of documentation, the Commission has to continue to resort to interviews of the personnel involved in relevant activities.

30. During the reporting period, the Commission conducted two full, final and complete disclosure verification missions. The first one, UNSCOM 168 in November 1996, attempted to trace the movement and storage of proscribed items primarily related to Project 1728, the main Iraqi effort to produce proscribed missile engines. Through interviews and site inspections, including excavation at the location of a hide site, the Commission was able to obtain some evidence that corroborated portions of Iraq's declarations on the secret destruction. However, many inconsistencies were revealed between information in the full, final and complete disclosure and the facts available to the Commission. Additional efforts will be required by Iraq to account fully for proscribed items and equipment related to Project 1728. The team also pointed to inconsistencies in the material balance of proscribed components related to the Karama project, the main activity in Iraq to produce guidance and control systems for proscribed missiles. The UNSCOM 168 team undertook preparatory work for the December political level talks which included interviews of personnel involved in the storage, movement and destruction, and in accounting of proscribed missile assets declared to have been secretly destroyed in 1991.

31. In January 1997, the UNSCOM 176 team was sent to receive a number of explanations that had previously been requested, to discuss them with Iraqi counterparts and to conduct interviews to verify relevant parts of the full, final and complete disclosure. However, it turned out that most of the explanations sought were not ready although some of them had been requested well in advance. Despite repeated requests since September 1996, Iraq failed to provide access to personnel with knowledge of certain events relevant to the secret destruction. The situation deteriorated to the point where the team had to suspend its activities. Although later on Iraq provided or offered to provide the documents requested, the UNSCOM 176 effort was essentially wasted and valuable time was lost in verification of Iraq's full, final and complete disclosure.

32. In verifying Iraq's declarations, the Commission has spent considerable effort in mapping out Iraq's proscribed missile programme. In 1994, in a spirit of cooperation, the Commission even undertook to write a history of Iraq's proscribed missile programme so that Iraq could authenticate it as an official description of relevant Iraqi activities. By mid-1995 this project was close to its completion with many parts certified by Iraq as accurate. However, shortly thereafter, it became obvious that, in many important aspects, Iraq had been intentionally misleading the Commission by providing incorrect information as cover for important progress achieved in its proscribed missile programmes. This required the Commission to resume verification of those areas.

33. During the reporting period, the Commission made progress in the verification of the new full, final and complete disclosure of July 1996. However, in a number of cases, the Commission found that it was incorrect and incomplete. A new impetus was given through the December round of political level talks between the Deputy Prime Minister and the Chairman with Iraq's undertaking to address thoroughly the Commission's concerns. After December, Iraq submitted a number of new papers related to the issues discussed at the meeting. These are currently under study.

Monitoring activities

34. During the reporting period, the missile monitoring teams have conducted over 250 inspections and have actively participated with other resident teams in joint inspections of sites of inter-disciplinary interest. In addition, the Commission has conducted two special monitoring inspections related to non-proscribed missile systems, i.e., those with a range of less than 150 kilometres. In November and December 1996, the monitoring teams conducted the second and third of the annual checks of Iraq's non-proscribed operational missile systems. The missions ascertained that these missiles had not been modified for prohibited purposes. In March 1997, UNSCOM 181 carried out inspections of a selected group of military units in order to verify that the relevant sites were not involved in training, maintenance or operation of prohibited missile systems. No evidence of proscribed activities was found.

35. Since the adoption of resolution 687 (1991), Iraq has continued undeclared missile programmes. The Commission has uncovered specific cases of proscribed missile activities. Iraq has also been engaged in covert acquisition of missile components and technologies. Such Iraqi activities remain under close scrutiny and are being investigated both through ongoing monitoring and special inspections.

36. In October 1996, the UNSCOM 164 team investigated Iraq's missile-related procurement efforts since 1991. In late 1995, Iraq acknowledged some of those procurement activities, including actual deliveries, and provided information on orders placed through middlemen and front companies for the acquisition of proscribed or dual-use equipment, technologies and materials for its missile facilities. Through inspection of a number of industrial sites and trading companies, the UNSCOM 164 team gathered information related to these procurement efforts that allowed it to close some gaps in the Commission's understanding of Iraq's activities. Some issues of concern still remain, including an undeclared attempt to obtain foreign assistance in the area of a proscribed key missile engine component. The Commission intends to continue to conduct inspections and investigations related to recent or current procurement activities by Iraq as part of its ongoing monitoring.

37. The Commission continues to send to Iraq specialized teams to perform technical analysis of Iraq's current programmes to develop and manufacture non-proscribed missile systems. In January 1997, UNSCOM 166 reviewed progress activities related to the Samoud missile, which has a declared range of less than 150 kilometres and is therefore not prohibited under resolution 687 (1991). Through this review, in addition to monitoring activities by the resident missile team, relevant Iraqi declarations on the project were corroborated.

38. The UNSCOM 166 team discovered evidence of Iraq's effort related to a space launch vehicle after the adoption of resolution 687 (1991). The team obtained conclusive proof of an attempt in 1992 to simulate a space launch vehicle based on a proscribed missile system. Evidence was also obtained of a study in 1994 and 1995 of a space launch vehicle based on a non-proscribed missile system. Space launch vehicles are prohibited to Iraq.

39. The UNSCOM 166 team made several requests to Iraq to provide computer software and documents related to the issues under the team's investigation. In a number of cases, Iraq refused to provide access to the information requested. Although most of the documents were provided later on, the lack of cooperation on the part of Iraq during the inspection significantly hindered the team's ability to accomplish fully its tasks.

40. Since the Commission's monitoring system in the missile area became operational in August 1994, Iraq's non-proscribed activities in the missile area have moved closer to a production phase. This requires modifications to the current monitoring practices in order to enable the Commission to accomplish effectively its tasks. As the export-import mechanism has become fully operational, a closer coordination with the export-import monitoring activities will be required. A review of the monitoring regime and practices is currently under way. The Commission is addressing a number of specific issues in order to maintain the effectiveness of its monitoring system and meet new challenges.

41. Overall, the reporting period resulted in substantial progress in the missile area. However, it fell short of the Commission's expectations due to Iraq's non-cooperation and its reluctance to provide in an open and transparent manner declarations required of it, including documentary support. The Commission will continue its intensive verification efforts pursuant to the priorities and methods established in the joint programme of action of 22 June 1996.

IV. NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES

42. The Special Commission continues to provide logistical and other operational support for IAEA operations in Iraq, to designate sites for inspection and to receive and advise on requests from Iraq to move or use any material or equipment related to Iraq's nuclear weapons programme or other nuclear activities. The Commission's nuclear experts also participate in the nuclear aspects of the export/import monitoring mechanism in the analysis of the content of notification forms in coordination and cooperation with IAEA.

43. Commission experts have participated in some ongoing monitoring and verification activities of the IAEA in December 1996 and March 1997. Multi-disciplinary inspections have been conducted and additional missions of this sort are planned in the coming year. Closer integration between the Commission's and the IAEA's systems continues to be implemented. Regular meetings are held in both Vienna and New York to exchange information and to plan cross-disciplinary inspections. The Commission's experts continue to participate in the IAEA negotiations with the Russian Federation regarding the sale of the nuclear fuel removed from Iraq and reprocessed in the Russian Federation.

V. CONCEALMENT INVESTIGATIONS

44. In its October 1996 report, the Commission stated that "there was an organized mechanism of concealment used by Iraq to deny access to proscribed documents and material retained since the adoption of resolution 687 (1991)" and expressed its intention to pursue all aspects of its investigation of concealment activities.

45. In November 1996, the UNSCOM 158 team carried out a geophysical mapping survey of a villa where proscribed missile equipment, tools and materials had been buried. This villa was owned by a member of the Special Republican Guard who, in the summer of 1991, together with additional Special Republic Guard officers, received several truckloads of proscribed material in order to keep it from the Commission. Although, the Iraqi authorities had admitted that such activity had occurred, their answers to the Commission's questions concerning the scope of the effort, its timing, and the command structures were evasive. The Commission was able to determine precisely where the items had been buried, and subsequent excavation uncovered some remnants of the material.

46. Undeclared sites inspected by the UNSCOM 158 team consisted of Special Republican Guard facilities and a residence used in the past for procurement activities. No proscribed material was found at any of the sites. In the case of the inspection of one of the Special Republican Guard sites, the inspectors were denied access for several hours. The UNSCOM aerial inspection team was likewise denied overflight of the facility. These actions constituted a breach of Iraq's obligations under the relevant resolutions of the Council.

47. In December 1996, the Commission continued its investigation by examining, jointly with IAEA, the concealment activities between January and July 1991, involving the Engineering Design Centre - Iraq's centrifuge and gaseous diffusion enrichment projects. The results of this mission are still being assessed, although patterns of Iraq's behaviour in this area appear to have mirrored known concealment activities in other areas. In March 1997, IAEA excavated three declared equipment burial sites south of Lake Tharthar and unearthed hundreds of items relating to Engineering Design Centre operations. Although many of these items are consistent with Iraq's declaration, a previously undeclared and highly expensive cache of unused specialized, corrosion resistant valves was found. The excavation exercise was facilitated by the utilization of geophysical sensors provided through UNSCOM.

48. In November 1996 and March 1997, UNSCOM 158 and UNSCOM 179 conducted a series of underwater surveys in Iraq using a combination of sonar and electromagnetic sensors.

49. In March 1997, the Commission undertook a major investigation of the concealment mechanism. An inspection team, UNSCOM 182, visited 17 sites looking for possible connections between concealment activities and elements of the Special Republican Guard. Other sites visited included those belonging to Iraq's Intelligence Service (Mukhabarat), the Special Security Organization, the General Security Service and the Military Intelligence. No proscribed material or activity was found. The Commission welcomes Iraq's cooperation in providing access to the sensitive sites for inspection.

50. Through political level meetings and inspection activities, the Commission has continued to ask for Iraq's response to its questions related to concealment activities. The October 1996 report mentioned such issues as movement of "Scud-like" objects in the vicinity of a site designated for inspection by UNSCOM 155 in July 1996, concealment of documents at the "chicken farm", and diversion activities related to Iraq's major proscribed missile projects. Iraq's failure to provide its response delays the verification process.

51. The investigation of the concealment mechanism in Iraq is an ongoing process. The joint programme of action of 22 June 1996 singled out this area as a priority and fundamental issue for verification. No final accounting of proscribed materials and activities can be achieved without a complete understanding of the procedures and structure of the concealment activities in Iraq. Ongoing monitoring cannot be viewed in total confidence without the Commission being sure that the concealment mechanism has been dismantled completely and is no longer functioning. The Commission will continue its concealment investigations as an integral part of its overall activities.

VI. OTHER ISSUES

A. Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre and operations

52. The working conditions at the Baghdad Centre continue to improve with the addition of six rooms which will relieve overcrowding and provide more secure work space. The Commission is particularly grateful to the Government of Switzerland, which has repeatedly provided skilled craftsmen to renovate the Centre.

53. The Chilean Air Force has supported the Commission since August 1996 through the provision of a detachment of five Bell UH-1H helicopters and 41 personnel. They have conducted over 1,000 hours of accident-free aerial support in Iraq. The new type of helicopter and their number have added greater flexibility to monitoring operations. Multiple missions each day are now possible. The Chilean helicopter unit has performed resolutely and professionally in the face of escalating Iraqi efforts to harass, intimidate and at times threaten the Commission's aerial operations. The Government of Chile and its personnel working in Iraq are to be commended for their important contribution. The Chairman visited Chile in March 1997 and held discussions with senior officials on the operations of the Chilean helicopter unit provided to the Commission and IAEA.

54. The Baghdad-based aerial inspection team has adapted well to the introduction of the new type of helicopters and the imagery produced by the team has been of consistent quality. The team continues to provide support to the monitoring teams and to non-resident inspection teams. Some 800 missions have been completed to date. As mentioned earlier in this report, the team has been subjected to a number of efforts by Iraq to restrict its activities.

55. The imagery derived from the Commission's high altitude surveillance aircraft (U-2) continues to be an important element in the Commission's and IAEA

inspection activities. Some 350 missions had been flown up to the end of March 1997.

B. Finance

56. The financial situation facing the Commission has been precarious, particularly during 1996. In a letter of 5 November 1996 to the President of the Security Council, the Chairman pointed out that, as there had been no new cash contributions to the Commission in the previous six months, funds were running out. During a visit to the member States of the Gulf Cooperation Council in November 1996, the Chairman received firm assurances of strong political support for the Commission's activities as well as an undertaking to provide financial support to the Commission. Two Gulf Cooperation Council States provided voluntary contributions to the Commission during January 1997 totalling $5 million. The Commission is particularly grateful to those Governments for their continued support.

57. The Commission is now receiving funds for the implementation of resolution 986 (1995). This should cover the operational costs of the Commission up until the middle of 1997. The voluntary contributions noted in the preceding paragraph will be drawn upon should funding from resolution 986 (1995) cease.

C. Material support

58. The Commission remains grateful to all States that have continued to provide the Commission with material support in the conduct of its operations. A notable contribution is the continued generous provision of premises by Bahrain for the Commission's field offices. The Secretary-General and the Director General of IAEA have recently written to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Bahrain proposing a further six-month extension of the field office agreement until the end of September 1997, as they deem Bahrain's contribution to be a vital element in the operations of the Commission and IAEA under the Security Council resolutions.

D. Office space

59. Office space at the Commission's headquarters in New York remains a serious problem. However, additional office space is now being made available on the 30th floor, adjacent to the Commission's existing offices on that floor. This should provide some relief of the current concerns over space, but does not solve all of the Commission's urgent needs.

Appendix II

Inspection schedule in the reporting period, October 1996-April 1997

(in-country dates)

Nuclear

1 October-22 October 1996	NMG 96-14
22 October-11 November 1996	NMG 96-15
11 November-2 December 1996	NMG 96-16
2 December-19 December 1996	NMG 96-17
19 December-6 January 1997	NMG 96-18
6 January-30 January 1997	NMG 97-01
30 January-20 February 1997	NMG 97-02
20 February-13 March 1997	NMG 97-03
13 March-3 April 1997	NMG 97-04

Chemical

29 November-11 December 1996	CW 27/UNSCOM 135
2 December-6 December 1996	CW 33/UNSCOM 170
18 December-15 January 1997	CG 8
10 January-15 January 1997	CW 34/UNSCOM 171
27 March-31 March 1997	CW 35/UNSCOM 172
16 January-present	CG 9

Biological

29 September-7 January 1997	BG 7
14 October-23 October 1996	BW 41/UNSCOM 159
11 November-18 November 1996	BW 43/UNSCOM 163
2 December-8 December 1996	BW 42/UNSCOM 160
12 December-17 December 1996	BW 44/UNSCOM 167
7 January-1 April 1997	BG 8
9 January-20 January 1997	BW 45/UNSCOM 169
12 February-19 February 1997	BW 46/UNSCOM 173
24 February-3 March 1997	BW 47/UNSCOM 174
2 April-present	BG 9

Ballistic missiles

9 August-22 November 1996	MG 10
21 October-28 October 1996	BM 44/UNSCOM 164
4 November-16 November 1996	BM 46/UNSCOM 168
6 November-16 November 1996	BM 45/UNSCOM 158
11 November-16 November 1996	MG 10B
22 November-25 February 1997	MG 11
18 November-30 November 1996	BM 38D/UNSCOM 141D
27 November-2 December 1996	MG 11A

11 December-14 December 1996	Special Mission 4
6 January-25 January 1997	BM 47/UNSCOM 177
10 January-20 January 1997	BM 48/UNSCOM 166
20 January-27 January 1997	BM 49/UNSCOM 176
6 February-26 February 1997	BM 47A/UNSCOM 177A
26 February-present	MG 12
2 March-13 March 1997	BM 51/UNSCOM 179
4 March-13 March 1997	BM 52/UNSCOM 181
7 March-17 March 1997	BM 53/UNSCOM 182

Export/import missions

3 August-20 November 1996	EG-2
14 November-25 November 1996	EXIM-3/UNSCOM 165
21 November-8 January 1996	EG-3
9 January-present	EG-4

Special missions

19 October-21 October 1996
21 November-25 November 1996
8 December-11 December 1996
20 February-23 February 1997
3 April-5 April 1997

A complete list of the Commission's inspections prior to the period covered by the present report is available in the Commission's October 1996 report (S/1996/848).

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1997/302
11 April 1997

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 11 APRIL 1997 FROM THE CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF YUGOSLAVIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of an aide-mémoire issued by the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia concerning the situation in the region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Vladislav JOVANOVIĆ
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

97-09837 (E) 140497

/...

Annex

Aide-mémoire dated 11 April 1997 by the Government of Yugoslavia

In its statement No. 3 on the documents programme for the region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium of 9 April 1997, circulated as an official document of the Security Council (S/1997/294), the Government of Croatia claims that 119,112 domovnicas, 30,426 naturalization documents and 93,846 identification cards had been issued as at 6 April 1997. It goes on to say that two thirds of the documents were issued to pre-war residents of the region and one third to persons who had moved into the region since 1991. It concludes that "the total number of issued domovnicas compares very favourably" with the number of residents in the region.

The Croatian data are in contrast with the data in possession of the United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES). According to the Croatian data, 184,643 residents lived in the region before 1991. (Even according to previous Croatian statements, 193,513 residents lived there before 1991.) According to the UNTAES data of 1 February 1997, 169,585 residents live in the region, while 96,000 persons who lived there before now live outside the region. By simply adding the number of present residents of the region (169,585) and the number of the former residents who now live outside it (96,000), one arrives at a total of 265,585, so the Croatian statement to the effect that two thirds of documents were issued to pre-1991 residents and one third to persons who moved into the region subsequently sounds less than logical.

It is significant that the Government of Croatia provides no information in its statement about the nationality of the applicants and of those to whom the documents have been issued, which leads to the conclusion that most of 119,112 domovnicas and 93,846 identification cards issued have in fact been issued to applicants other than Serbs. This is borne out by the fact that only 39,000 Serbs have been registered to vote in the region, for which, it is recalled, possession of both documents is required. It is also recalled that applications for the issuance of documents have been processed for those residents who left the region in 1991 and who, according to Croatian sources, number 96,000.

It is a fact that owing to the lack of readiness of the Croatian authorities to process the applications of the Serbs for the issuance of domovnicas and identification cards, which are the basis for the registration of Serbs on the voters' lists, the United Nations Transitional Administrator, Mr. Jacques Klein, was compelled to extend the voter registration deadline for the upcoming local elections on two occasions (most recently on 4 April 1997), which gives credence to the justified suspicion that the number of Serbs entered on the voters' lists provided by the Croatian side is not credible.

Croatia seeks also on this occasion to shift its obligations towards its citizens vis-à-vis the protection and the disposal of their property onto the international community. The statement of the Government of Croatia to the effect that "the international community and the Government of Croatia will need to find ways to balance properly the efforts on behalf of the Serbs in the

region with the efforts on behalf of 96,000 mostly non-Serb displaced persons and refugees who have been waiting for almost five years to return to their homes in the region" can be understood in no other way.

It is obvious that rather than balancing international efforts, the Government of Croatia should enable all Serbian expellees and refugees now living in the region to return free and safe to the homes that they had to flee in the wake of the Croatian military intervention and to grant them fair compensation for destroyed property. This is not an obligation of the international community, but of Croatia. Also Croatia must revoke its laws denying the Serbs the right to enjoy their property. In addition, it would have to stop altering the demography of the regions settled predominantly by Serbs by settling them with Croatian refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina. (See the relevant reports of the Special Rapporteur of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights on the situation of human rights in the territory of the former Yugoslavia and of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).)

The fact that out of the total number of 48,000 Serbian refugees from other parts of Croatia who are, according to the UNTAES data, now living in the region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium only 8,000 have been entered on the voters' lists is telling evidence that the criteria for voter registration used by Croatia (proven stay in the region) are susceptible to various abuses, administrative delays and arbitrary denial of voter registration. This is also pointed out in the statement by the President of the Security Council of 7 March 1997 (S/PRST/1997/10), in which Croatia is called upon "to meet all preconditions, including the issuance of documents", while concern is expressed that "implementation of these procedures has been uneven". Croatia is also urged to redouble its efforts to ensure the completion of the necessary preconditions for holding free and democratic elections. The use of the expression "naturalization documents" is inadequate, considering the fact that the persons who are being granted Croatian citizenship by the Government of Croatia are citizens of Croatia and not of any other country. In using the expression, the Government of Croatia is wittingly disregarding the fact that of 30,426 "naturalized" persons only 8,000 have been enabled to exercise their right to participate in the elections.

The assertions that President Tudjman and the Government of Croatia have encouraged the Serbs on numerous occasions to stay in Croatia is in stark contrast with the actual state of affairs. The Serbian refugees from Croatia are called by President Tudjman "optants" rather than refugees, while he terms their forced exodus under duress "voluntary departure". In his statement in Osijek on 26 February 1997, however, United States Ambassador to Croatia Peter Galbraith stated, inter alia, that those people were no optants and that they had in fact fled the imminent war and subsequent events in the Krajina, while the systematic burning of their homes and large-scale killings proved that the fears of Serbs had been justified. It is further recalled that the chairman of the Croatian Helsinki Committee accused the Government of Croatia of instigating lawlessness and crime in the Krajina and Western Slavonia.

The public statements of the Vice-President of the Government of Croatia, Ivica Kostović, to the effect that displaced Serbs cannot be treated in the same

way as refugees of Croatian nationality and that forms used for Serbs should be different from those used for Croats are also widely known. Zvonimir Puljić, the Government Commissar at Knin, made a public statement (known also to the OSCE High Rapporteur for the question of minorities, Mr. van den Stoschlom) to the effect that Serbs cannot and must not return to their homes even though they may be empty, since they will be treated as looters. This applies also to Serbs from Eastern Slavonia. Many other Croatian officials have made similar statements, which are far from being of a sort to "encourage" the Serbs to stay in, or return to, Croatia.

The assertion that 14,459 Serbian refugees have returned to Croatia is fully denied in the report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Ms. Elisabeth Rehn, in which it is stated that only 2,000 Serbs have returned to Croatia, only 55 of them through the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) offices. In that context, it should be borne in mind that over 350,000 refugees from Croatia have found refuge in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and that they are bereft of any possibility of returning to their ancestral homes as the Croatian Embassy in Belgrade refuses to issue them the necessary documents. Croatia continues to turn a deaf ear to the positions of the European Union, presented in its statement of 11 February 1997 (A/52/78-S/1997/133, annex), in which the right of Serbian refugees from Croatia now living in neighbouring countries to citizenship, safe return to Croatia and participation in the forthcoming elections was reaffirmed. Furthermore, Croatia refuses to act upon the statement by the President of the Security Council of 7 March 1997 (S/PRST/1997/10) in which "the right of all refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes of origin throughout the Republic of Croatia and to live there in conditions of security" is reaffirmed.

Against a backdrop of a myriad of facts that show it to be vacuous, the assertion quoted from the studies of an unnamed Western institution to the effect that "Croats are among the most tolerant of publics in Europe in their views on minorities" rings very hollow indeed. In making this statement, its authors must bear in mind that over 350,000 Serbs have been expelled from Croatia, that columns of unarmed civilian refugees, fleeing the Croatian military, were strafed, shelled and shot at by other weapons in a most brutal manner on their way to Bosnia and Herzegovina and Yugoslavia and that many of them lost their lives. According to a Croatian Helsinki Watch report, about 2,000 Serbs were killed after Croatian military operations in Western Slavonia and the Krajina, 500 of them in Western Slavonia. The Serbs who decided to stay in Croatia are exposed to various forms of pressure, threats and all forms of discrimination, including physical liquidation, which was pointed out also by United States Ambassador to Croatia Peter Galbraith in his statement in Osijek on 26 February 1997. On that occasion he expressed the grave concern of the United States that a large number of Serbs outside Croatia, in possession of Croatian citizenship or fulfilling all the conditions to acquire it, were being prevented from returning to Croatia.

The Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Ms. Elisabeth Rehn, pointed out in her letter to the Chairman of the Commission of 4 April 1997 that there existed many reasons for serious concern over the lack of respect for human rights in Croatia. This is documented by the fact that the Serbs in the Krajina are living in a psychosis of fear and continue to

be victims of violence motivated by ethnic differences. Particularly serious is the situation in the former Sector South (Knin), in which systematic destruction of Serbian property and violence against Serbs is continuing. It is noted that an ever greater number of Croatian refugees and displaced persons are coming to the Krajina and moving into Serbian houses. The Special Rapporteur records her deep disappointment at the realization of a great aversion of many Croats towards the return of Serbs.

These statements put the Croatian assertion that "Croats are among the most tolerant of publics in Europe" into proper perspective.

The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has proposed to Croatia to conclude a series of agreements aimed at strengthening the legal basis for inter-state, good-neighbourly and stable relations. Bearing in mind the real problems of the Serbs in Croatia, particularly in the region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium, and the artificial barriers to the safe return of over 350,000 refugees from various parts of Croatia who are now sheltered in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, it has been proposed that the countries conclude an agreement on double citizenship. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is of the opinion that the conclusion of such an agreement would contribute to the promotion of relations and the feeling of security of Serbs in Croatia, particularly in the region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium, and to refugees desirous of returning to Croatia. To that end, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia will continue its engagement in bilateral contacts, paying full heed to the pursuit of any other alternative avenue open to it.

The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia calls for the removal of all barriers and administrative and psychological or political obstacles to a free and organized return of refugees to their original places of residence in Croatia. The return should evolve with the involvement, assistance and monitoring of the international community, primarily UNHCR and OSCE, to which Yugoslavia is ready to render appropriate assistance, either directly or in the framework of a continued development of bilateral Yugoslav-Croatian relations. In doing so, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is proceeding from its deep conviction that by means of free and safe return of refugees and genuine guarantees for their safety, with international monitoring, the conditions are being created and promoted for lasting stability and good-neighbourly relations in the region.

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11 April 1997

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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fifty-first session
Agenda item 58
QUESTION OF CYPRUS

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fifty-second year

Letter dated 10 April 1997 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 10 April 1997 addressed to you by His Excellency Mr. Osman Ertuğ, Representative of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (see annex).

I should be grateful if the text of the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 58, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Hüseyin E. ÇELEM
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

ANNEX

Letter dated 10 April 1997 from Mr. Osman Ertuğ addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government I have the honour to respond to the letters dated 26 March and 3 April 1997, respectively, addressed to you by the Greek Cypriot representative and the Greek Cypriot Chargé d'affaires a.i. at the United Nations, which were circulated as documents A/51/865-S/1997/288 and A/51/856-S/1997/278 of 8 April and 4 April 1997.

The said letters repeat the well-known allegations of the Greek Cypriot side regarding "violations of the airspace of the Republic of Cyprus and of the flight information region of Nicosia ...". I would like to reiterate emphatically that these allegations stem from the unfounded claim of the Greek Cypriot side to be the sole sovereign authority in the island and over its airspace, whereas it has no jurisdiction, control or authority whatsoever over the national territory, airspace or flight information region of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.

In this connection, I would also like to reiterate that flights by Turkish aircraft within the airspace and flight information region of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus are a matter that concerns the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and Turkey as two sovereign independent States which recognize each other. Any attempted interference with this airspace or the flight information region is legally void and serves no other purpose than further raising tension in the island, which is already high as a result of the recent purchase by the Greek Cypriot side of the sophisticated S-300 missile system, as well as its overall militarization activity, in defiance of Security Council resolution 1092 (1996).

I would like to state, in conclusion, that at a time when efforts are being made to resume direct negotiations between the leaders of the two sides in Cyprus under United Nations auspices, this kind of politically motivated propaganda does not enhance prospects for the resumption of these negotiations and does not serve the cause of peace in the island.

I should be grateful if the text of the present letter could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 58, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Osman ERTUĞ
Representative
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1997/304
14 April 1997

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

PROGRESS REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS ANGOLA VERIFICATION MISSION (UNAVEM III)

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 1102 (1997) of 31 March 1997, by which the Council extended the mandate of UNAVEM III until 16 April 1997 and requested me to report by 14 April on the status of the installation of the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation. The report covers developments since my last report, dated 25 March (S/1997/248).

II. STATUS OF THE FORMATION OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT

2. On 31 March, I briefed the Security Council on my visit to Angola from 22 to 25 March 1997. I also described the extensive efforts which have been made recently to further the peace process in Angola and, in particular, to ensure the earliest possible installation of the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation. In addition, the members of the Security Council will recall that, following the arrival in Luanda of 63 out of 70 elected deputies of the União para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) and of all 11 of its designated officials, the Government and UNITA agreed that the UNITA deputies would take their seats in the National Assembly on 9 April and that the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation would be installed on 11 April.

3. An extraordinary session of the Joint Commission was held on 31 March to confirm those arrangements. Consensus was also reached at that meeting on the draft text of the document on the special status of Mr. Jonas Savimbi as president of the largest opposition party. It was agreed that the document would be promulgated as law by the National Assembly before 9 April. The Government confirmed those dates in a communiqué issued on 31 March. However, on 2 April 1997, the Political Bureau of the Movimento Popular para a Libertação de Angola (MPLA) also issued a communiqué in which, while reaffirming the dates for the swearing-in ceremony of the UNITA members of Parliament and the inauguration of the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation, it demanded that other important tasks deriving from the Lusaka Protocol be implemented without further delay. It also suggested that the draft legislation on the special status of the UNITA leader should be approved by the National Assembly

only after the UNITA deputies had assumed their seats. However, following additional consultations conducted with the support of the representatives of the three observer States (Portugal, Russian Federation and United States of America), my Special Representative, Mr. Alioune Blondin Beye, was able to make a statement clarifying the situation and confirming the agreements reached earlier.

4. On 8 April, the National Assembly enacted into law the text on the special status of Mr. Savimbi, which was adopted with minor amendments. That legislation, which can be amended or suspended only with the consent of the president of UNITA, defines his rights, duties and immunities. As scheduled, on the following day, 67 out of 70 UNITA members were sworn in at a ceremony which was attended by members of the Government, the Council of the Republic and representatives of the diplomatic corps. The remaining three deputies were unable to arrive in Luanda in time, owing either to illness or to difficulties with transportation. Subsequently, the National Assembly elected from among UNITA deputies a second vice-president and a second secretary of the Assembly.

5. On 11 April, the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation was inaugurated, during a solemn ceremony attended by Heads of State and Government and other dignitaries from various countries, including the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the representatives of the three observer States. Mr. Savimbi sent a special message which was read out by the UNITA vice-president. As expected, Prime Minister Fernando França Van Dunem and most ministers in the previous Government were reappointed, together with four ministers and seven vice ministers from UNITA. This important event marks a milestone in the Angolan peace process.

III. MILITARY AND POLICE ASPECTS

6. At the session of the Joint Commission held on 31 March, particular concern was expressed at the slow pace of the incorporation of selected UNITA soldiers into the Forças Armadas Angolanas (FAA) and into the Angolan National Police. Neither process has advanced substantially since my last report to the Security Council (S/1997/248). The Joint Commission decided to dispatch four special groups composed of representatives of the Government, UNITA and UNAVEM to visit quartering areas/selection and demobilization centres to assess the situation and to identify steps which have to be taken in order to accelerate the incorporation of UNITA soldiers into FAA and the national police and the demobilization of excess personnel. Those recommendations, which include the need to improve coordination and logistic support to the above processes as well as the need to issue specific instructions for UNITA commanders in the quartering areas, will be considered by the Joint Commission shortly.

7. As of 10 April, of 18,558 UNITA troops selected, 7,949 had in fact been incorporated into FAA. While the quartering of UNITA police has now been formally concluded, only slightly more than 500 of them, out of a total of 5,040, have been selected for service in the national police. It appears that the stringent educational, age and fitness criteria which have been applied so far have excluded many potential candidates from possible selection. In the meantime, the beginning of the rapid demobilization programme, which is

described in paragraph 12 below, has been postponed several times, creating additional hardship for UNITA soldiers and their families and imposing further financial difficulties on the United Nations.

8. The large number of deserters and absentees from the selection and demobilization centres remains a source of serious concern. Efforts are under way to make ex-combatants aware of the benefits of demobilization, in order to encourage those who left the quartering areas to return as soon as possible. With regard to command posts, UNITA has declared that their four remaining centres have now been dismantled, and this is being verified by UNAVEM III. The United Nations is also continuing to encourage the parties to dismantle a total of 135 illegal checkpoints, 77 of which belong to UNITA. In addition, UNAVEM is still awaiting from UNITA complete information concerning the strength and weaponry of the security detachment of the UNITA president.

9. UNAVEM III is proceeding with the gradual withdrawal of its formed military units. The next repatriation, of approximately 220 military personnel, is scheduled for 20 April. As a result, the strength of UNAVEM's military units will have been reduced by approximately 30 per cent. As previously indicated, this phased drawdown will continue, while taking into account the situation on the ground. However, under present plans, it is still my intention to complete the process by the end of August 1997.

10. I am seriously concerned at recent reports of involvement by the Angolan parties in the Zairian conflict. I discussed this issue with President dos Santos and Mr. Savimbi during my recent visit to Angola. Both of them denied that they were providing support to the warring parties in Zaire. Obviously, such interference would have very serious consequences not only for the peace process in Angola, but also for the ongoing efforts to bring the current crisis in Zaire to an end, in accordance with the peace plan endorsed by the Security Council.

IV. HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS

11. During the reporting period, humanitarian activities throughout the country continued to focus on the completion of the demobilization process, acceleration of the social reintegration of ex-combatants and their dependants, as well as on the reconstruction of basic services in order to absorb large population influxes. However, a number of security incidents have hindered humanitarian activities in the central and southern regions of the country, while difficulties continue to be experienced with the free circulation of people in the areas controlled by UNITA in the northern and eastern parts of Angola. In the meantime, some 2,000 new internally displaced persons from UNITA areas recently arrived in the vicinity of the city of Malange.

12. As of 12 April 1997, a total of 2,124 under-age UNITA military personnel have been demobilized from eight selection and demobilization centres. Following the disbursement by the Government of the funds for a special subsidy, a new schedule was approved for the rapid demobilization of excess UNITA personnel in the central and southern regions. This exercise is scheduled to begin on 14 April 1997 in Vila Nova, to be continued in Londuimbali and Quibala

on 21 April and at the Chicuma and N'Gove quartering areas on 28 April. In the meantime, the Government is adopting additional steps to ensure that the mechanism for the disbursement of the discharge subsidy through a provincial network becomes fully operational. In a welcome development, the staff for the demobilization offices in Luanda and the provinces has been selected from among Government and UNITA candidates.

13. The planned transition of the responsibility for support of the national mine-clearance programme in Angola from UNAVEM to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has been seriously delayed primarily because the Government has not yet signed the project document which was submitted for its approval in January 1997. In the present circumstances, I believe it would be essential, as an interim measure, to continue to provide operational support to this important programme on a cost-reimbursable basis from the Department of Humanitarian Affairs at least until the end of June 1997. Unless urgent steps are taken to implement transitional arrangements as described in my previous reports to the Council, the entire programme may be undermined and additional effort might be required to sustain it after June.

V. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

14. As indicated in paragraph 33 of my report of 25 March 1997 (S/1997/248), the General Assembly has provided resources for the maintenance of UNAVEM III for the period from 1 July 1996 to 30 June 1997, to be assessed on Member States at a monthly rate of $22,996,400 gross ($22,496,800 net), subject to the extension of the mandate of the Mission by the Security Council.

15. Should the Security Council decide to extend the mandate of UNAVEM III, as recommended in paragraph 20 of the present report, the cost of maintaining the Mission would be within the monthly rate indicated above.

16. As at 9 April 1997, unpaid assessed contributions to the UNAVEM special account for the period since the inception of the Mission amounted to $93.0 million. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations was $1,659.0 million.

VI. OBSERVATIONS

17. The developments of the last two weeks in Angola have been very encouraging. Never before has the country been so close to the final resolution of its devastating conflict and to the attainment of lasting peace.

18. The approval by the National Assembly of the legislation concerning the special status of the UNITA president, the swearing-in of the UNITA deputies in the National Assembly and the inauguration of the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation mark an essential step forward in the peace process. The Angolan people and their leaders should be congratulated on their determination, patience and perseverance. It is my sincere hope that rapid progress can now be made in completing the implementation of other aspects of the Lusaka Protocol in a spirit of cooperation and mutual accommodation. I also

hope that the long-awaited meeting between President dos Santos and Mr. Savimbi will soon take place, in order to consolidate the progress which has been achieved towards national reconciliation.

19. However, much remains to be done. With the establishment of the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation, the parties should move expeditiously to normalize State administration throughout the whole country, to complete the formation of the unified armed forces and the national police, as well as to demobilize the excess UNITA military personnel. Urgent and resolute steps are also needed to complete the other pending issues, including the status of the UNITA radio and of the security detachment of Mr. Savimbi, the disarmament of the civilian population, the dismantling of illegal command posts and checkpoints, as well as the handover by UNITA of its communication equipment.

20. I am convinced that the international community should remain engaged in Angola until the goal of full implementation of the Lusaka Protocol is achieved. In the meantime, since the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation has now been inaugurated, I recommend that the Security Council approve the extension of the mandate of UNAVEM III until 30 June 1997, on the understanding that the operation would gradually proceed with the transition towards an observer mission, as described in section VII of my report of 7 February 1997 to the Security Council (S/1997/115). The required transitional arrangements would be financed from within the resources already allocated for the Mission by the General Assembly (see para. 14 above). Should the Security Council agree to extend the mandate of UNAVEM III, as suggested above, I would further recommend that the observer mission, to be known as the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (UNOMA), be formally established on 1 July 1997. It is my intention to submit the financial implications for UNOMA to the Council well in advance of that date.

21. The main activities of the Observer Mission, in addition to the completion of the remaining military tasks, would focus on political, police and human rights aspects, as well as on humanitarian and public information programmes aimed at supporting and consolidating the national reconciliation process, with a view to creating conditions conducive to political stability, economic and social recovery and sustainable development.

Annex

UNAVEM III - Contributions as at 10 April 1997

Country	Military observers	Civilian police officers	Staff officers	Troops[a]	
Bangladesh	10	21	11	203	245
Brazil	20	9	35	911	975
Bulgaria	10	15	-	-	25
Congo	4	-	-	-	4
Egypt	10	15	1[b]	-	26
France	8	-	11[b]	-	19
Guinea-Bissau	19	4	-	-	23
Hungary	10	7	-	-	17
India	20	11	47	900	978
Jordan	20	22	2[b]	-	44
Kenya	10	-	-	-	10
Malaysia	20	20	2[b]	-	42
Mali	10	15	-	-	25
Namibia	-	-	4	203	207
Netherlands	15	10	2[b]	-	27
New Zealand	5	-	7[b]	-	12
Nigeria	22	21	-	-	43
Norway	5	-	-	-	5
Pakistan	10	-	15[b]	-	25
Poland	7	-	-	-	7
Portugal	10	28	8	297	343
Romania	-	-	22	759	781
Russian Federation	11	-	2	146	159
Senegal	10	-	-	-	10
Slovakia	5	-	-	-	5
Sweden	20	10	1	-	31
Ukraine	5	-	3	1	9
United Republic of Tanzania	-	3	-	-	3
Uruguay	7	13	37[b]	16	73
Zambia	18	15	20	505	558
Zimbabwe	21	22	40	679	762
TOTAL	342	261	270[c]	4 620	5 493

[a] Including military police.

[b] Including military specialists in the UNAVEM III demining school and in Quartering Area Administration.

[c] The total figure does not include the five demining experts seconded by Germany.


UNAVEM III
Deployment as of 10 April 1997
HQ UNAVEM HQ
RHQ Regional HQ
Planned UNMO's and UNPO's
UNMO's and UNPO's
UNMO's only
UNPO's only
Each Regional HQ is co-located with: RUS and POR
CONGO
ZAIRE
Brazzaville
Kinshasa
Cabinda
Soyo
Sumba
Noqui
Maquela do Zombo
M'banza Congo
Quimbele
N'zeto
NORTHERN REGION
UIGE
Negage/ Bungo
Caxito
Quibaxe
LUANDA
N'dalatando
Calombolocs
Atlantic Ocean
Malanje
Cafunfo
Luzamba
Catala
Muchinda
Camaxilo
Cuito
Lovua
Dundo
Andrada
Lucapa
Chiluage
SAURIMO
NORTH-EASTERN REGION
Cacolo
ZAIRE
Luau
Quibala/ Gungo
Mussende
CENTRAL REGION
Sumbe
Waku Kungo
N'harea
Andulo
Alto Hama/ Londumbali
Bailundo
HUAMBO
Kuito
Cuemba
Lobito
Benguela
Balombo
Cubal
Vila Nova/ Sambo
Chitembo/ Soma Kuanza
Chicuma
Chongoroi
Caconda
N'gove
Galague
Quilengues
Kuvango
MENONGUE
Matala
LUBANGO
Namibe
SOUTHERN REGION
Xangongo
Ondjiva
Caiundo
Culito Cuanavale
Mavinga
SOUTH-EASTERN REGION
Licua
LUENA
Lumeje
Cazombo
EASTERN REGION
Lumbala N'guimbo
ZAMBIA
Jamba
Mucusso
NAMIBIA
BOTSWANA
International boundary
National capital
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UNITED
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LETTER DATED 11 APRIL 1997 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF INDONESIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to request that the Security Council extend an invitation in accordance with rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure to Ambassador Engin A. Ansay, Permanent Observer of the Organization of the Islamic Conference to the United Nations, during the Council's forthcoming discussion of the item entitled "The situation in Afghanistan".

(Signed) Nugroho WISNUMURTI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
Chairman of the Islamic Group

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